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The regulatory takings issue is notoriously muddled.' Dramat-
ically opposing views regarding the proper relationship between
private  property  and  government  regulation  consistently  have
polarized scholarly debate.2  The Supreme Court today seems no
less splintered on the issue's proper resolution than it was when
it first embarked down the regulatory takings path with Justice
Holmes's  opinion  for  the  Court  in Pennsylvania Coal  Co.  v.
Mahon,'  from  which  Justice  Brandeis  sharply  dissented.  The
Court's regulatory takings decisions are among its most conten-
*  Professor  of Law,  Georgetown  University  School  of Law.  This Essay  is  based
on  a  presentation  given  April  11,  1996, at a  Symposium  on  Defining Takings:  Pri-
vate Property  and the Future of Government Regulation  sponsored  by  the William  &
Mary  School  of Law's  Institute  of Bill  of Rights  Law. I  would  like  to  thank Profes-
sor  Lynda  L.  Butler  for  inviting  me  to  participate  in  the  Symposium  and
Georgetown  University  law students  Andrea  Blander  and Andrew  Schaefer  for their
research  assistance  in preparing  this Essay. Finally,  I  served  as  counsel  for govern-
mental  entities  in many  of the  Supreme  Court  regulatory  takings  cases discussed  in
this  Essay.  This  Essay  expresses  my views  alone  and  not  necessarily  those  of  my
clients  in any  of those  cases.
1.  See  Carol  M.  Rose,  Mahon  Reconstructed: Why  the  Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle,  57 S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  561  (1984).
2.  Compare,  e.g.,  RICHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  TAKINGS:  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AND  THE
POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN  (1985)  (arguing  that the  Eminent  Domain  Clause  and
parallel  clauses  in  the  Constitution  render  many  reforms  of the  20th  century,  such
as  zoning,  constitutionally  suspect),  with  Thomas  C.  Grey,  The Malthusian Constitu-
tion, 41  U.  MIAMI  L.  REV.  21 (1986)  (criticizing Epstein's constitutionally  based  argu-
ment in Takings: Private  Property and the Power of Eminent Domain for rolling  back
the welfare  state through traditional  property  rights); Mark Kelman,  Taking Takings
Seriously. An  Essay for  Centrists, 74  CAL.  L.  REV.  1829,  1830  (1986)  (book  review)
(asserting that critical insights best expose  Epstein's  Takings "pretenses to  analytical
power");  and Joseph  L.  Sax,  Takings, 53  U.  CI.  L.  REV.  279,  292  (1986)  (book re-
view)  (stating that the  legal  and  economic  world  are  too  complex  for  Epstein's "sim-
ple formal  rules").
3.  260  U.S.  393  (1922).
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tious.  Many  are  decided  by  closely  divided  votes.4  Individual
Justices  seem to waver with regularity on the issues, prompting
majorities  in  one case  to become  dissents in another,  and vice
versa, thereby further deepening the precedental confusion.5
This  Essay focuses  on  a dimension  of the regulatory  takings
issue that has received relatively little attention in what is oth-
erwise  a vast amount of literature on the topic:  Why the Court
is  so  persistently  splintered  and  its  precedent  so  seemingly
schizophrenic.  Most  academic  discussion  has  focused  on  the
sheer  difficulty of reconciling the public's firmly held conception
of sacrosanct private property rights with the public's increasing
demand  for  restrictions  on  the  exercise  of  those  same  rights
when  they  affect  others  adversely.6  This  Essay's  thesis is that
reasons for this phenomenon  exist beyond those that have domi-
nated the ongoing academic  discourse. These  additional reasons
are best revealed  by piercing the popular fiction that the Court
is a monolithic institution. The Court's  decisions should instead
be read keeping in mind the fact that the Court is simply nine
individual Justices who speak through the voice of shifting coali-
tions of at least five Justices.
4.  See  discussion  infra Part I  and note  9.
5.  See  discussion  infra Part IIA.
6.  See,  e.g.,  JENNIFER  NEDELSKY,  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AND  THE  LIMITS  OF  AMERI-
CAN  CONST1TUTIONALISM  (1990);  Eric T.  Freyfogle,  The  Owning and  Taking of Sen-
sitive Lands, 43  UCLA  L. REv.  77,  78  (1995);  Frank  I. Michelman,  Property, Utility,
and Fairness:  Comments on  the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation"  Law,  80
HARV.  L.  REv.  1165,  1224-45  (1967);  Rose,  supra note  1,  at  594-97;  Joseph  L.  Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81  YALE  L.J.  149  (1971);  see also Jed
Rubenfeld,  Usings, 102  YALE  L.J.  1077,  1096  (1993)  (criticizing legal scholarship  that
focuses  on  "the irreconcilable  conceptual  demands  made  on  the  idea  of private  prop-
erty  within  our  legal  system"  as  "taking  takings  thinking  too  seriously");  Carol  M.
Rose, Property As  the Keystone  Right, 71  NOTRE  DAME  L.  REV.  329  (1996).  Professor
Rose  has  stated:
The  rhetoric  of property  often  seems  to  resound  with  the  notes  of heroic
autonomy  ...  . But  such  heroic  rhetoric  rests  on  the  quite  mistaken
notion  that this most intensely  social of institutions  hinges  on individual-
ism  alone, whereas  in fact it thoroughly  mixes independence  and coopera-
tion.  Indeed,  taken  to  an  extreme,  the  in-your-face  rhetoric  of property
rights  can  undermine  actual  institutions  of property,  suggesting that  any-




Such a piercing of the Court's judicial veil offers three lessons
about regulatory takings. First, it suggests the propriety of dis-
counting the import of the Court's precedent in individual cases
and the futility of reconciling what may be, at bottom, irreconcil-
able rulings. Advocates  and legal academics who ignore this les-
son routinely conflate the significance of the Court's precedent in
takings cases.
Second, by identifying the underlying reasons for the Court's
splintering  and  shifting majorities,  students  of the  regulatory
takings issue, as well as members  of the regulatory and regulat-
ed communities, can appreciate better the full dimensions of the
issue. By examining the votes  of individual  Justices in  each  of
the cases, the questions  asked at oral argument,  and the  argu-
ments made in the briefs, one discovers  the full panoply of fac-
tors that have  influenced  the  Justices  in takings  cases.  These
factors extend beyond the traditional debate between prepolitical
and civic conceptions  of property. By tugging in an oppositional
fashion at the Justices, these factors implicate a host of crosscut-
ting issues that make maintaining  the development  of a stable
majority on regulatory takings issues especially difficult.
Finally, a more focused examination of the individual Justices
suggests the kinds of arguments that a new majority coalition of
Justices now on the Court might find acceptable. Justice Kenne-
dy will be the decisive vote in the establishment of this new ma-
jority, and pragmatism will need  to replace  adherence  to purist
principles  in  any  advocacy  designed  to  promote  an  analytical
framework  capable  of being embraced  by a new majority led by
Justice Kennedy.
This Essay consists of three parts, followed by a brief conclu-
sion.  The  three  parts  roughly  mirror  the  three  lessons  to  be
learned in undertaking a closer examination of the reasons why
the Court's  regulatory  takings  precedent  exhibits  such  conflict
and doctrinal instability. First, the Essay describes the general
benefit gained from thinking of the Court as nine distinct Justices
in analyzing  the Court's  precedent, with illustrations  from the
Court's takings precedent. Next, in.an effort to identify the wide-
ranging factors that actually are at work in establishing  a ma-
jority on the Court in particular cases, the Essay explores a vari-
ety of source materials, ranging from opinions of individual Jus-
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tices to oral argument transcripts  to the briefs of the advocates
themselves.  Finally, the Essay makes  a preliminary attempt to
identify an analytical framework for the regulatory takings issue
that, although lacking purity of principle and perhaps bordering
on the  nihilistic,  may provide instead  the  level  of pragmatism
necessary to strike an acceptable balance between opposing views.
I.  LESSON NUMBER  ONE:  THE SIGNIFICANCE  OF THE
CONSTITUTION'S  "RULE  OF FIVE" FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
RELYING  UJPON  THE  CoURT's  REGULATORY  TAKINGS  PRECEDENT
Supreme  Court lore reports that Justice  Brennan  would  ask
his new law clerks to identify the single most important rule of
constitutional  law.  Following  a  heated  debate,  with  each  law
clerk undoubtedly seeking to impress the Justice with his or her
profound  understanding  of federal  constitutional  law,  Justice
Brennan reportedly would  announce  them all wrong. The most
important rule, he would declare,  is the "rule of five"--i.e.,  the
Court decides cases by a majority vote of at least five Justices.'
Justice Brennan  reportedly  practiced  what he  preached.  Upon
his resignation from the Court, many testified to his special abil-
ity to forge surprising majority coalitions in controversial cases.'
The regulatory  takings cases illustrate well the importance of
the "rule of five." Many  of the  decisions have only five Justices
joining the  majority opinion,  and there has been  no consistent
majority.9 The  difference  between  the majority and dissent has
been  stark, just  as  it first  was  in  Pennsylvania Coal  Co.  v.
Mahon." °  The  reasoning  of the  majority  in  one  case  becomes
7.  Mark  V.  Tushnet,  Themes  in  Warren  Court Biographies, 70  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.
748,  763  (1995).
8.  See  Thurgood  Marshall,  A  Tribute  to  Justice William  J.  Brennan, Jr.,  104
HARV.  L.  REV.  1, 5  (1990);  Abner J.  Mikva, A Tribute to Justice William J.  Brennan,
Jr., 104  HARV.  L.  REV.  9,  10  (1990);  Richard  A. Posner, A  Tribute to Justice William
J.  Brennan, Jr., 104  HARV.  L. REV.  13,  14  (1990);  Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to Jus-
tice William  J. Brennan, Jr., 104  HARV.  L. REV.  33,  37-38  (1990).
9.  See  Dolan  v.  City  of  Tigard,  512  U.S.  374  (1994);  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina
Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003  (1992);  Nollan  v.  California  Coastal  Comm'n,  483
U.S.  825  (1987);  Keystone  Bituminous  Coal  Ass'n  v.  DeBenedictis,  480  U.S.  470
(1987);  MacDonald,  Sommer  & Frates  v.  County  of Yolo,  477  U.S.  340  (1986);  San
Diego  Gas  & Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of San  Diego,  450  U.S.  621  (1981).
10.  260  U.S.  393  (1922).
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that of the dissent in the next (and vice versa)-sometimes with
very little time separating the Court's changing decisions.
Consider,  for example, the Court's  famed 1986  Term takings
trilogy, wherein the Court decided in rapid succession three sig-
nificant  regulatory  takings  cases:  Keystone  Bituminous  Coal
Ass'n  v.  DeBenedictis,"  decided  in  March,  and  First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v.  County of Los  Angeles 2  and
Nollan  v.  California Coastal Commission,3  both  decided  in
June. Keystone Bituminous and Nollan are rooted in wholly in-
compatible notions  of the relationship between private property
and police  power regulation.'4  Although to a lesser extent, it is
similarly difficult to square the jurisprudential underpinnings  of
First  English with the Court's ruling in Keystone Bituminous." 5
If one views the Court as a monolith, it is very difficult to dis-
cern the theory that unifies these three rulings. The Court cer-
tainly makes  little, if any, effort to  do so. If one instead  views
the Court as reflecting coalitions of individual Justices,  the pic-
ture becomes  more clear. Justice White was the only Justice in
the majority in all three cases, but he wrote none of the opinions
for the  Court; 6 nor did he write any separate  concurring  opin-
ions. It is therefore  more important to ask what made  a differ-
ence for Justice White in these cases than to undertake a fiction-
al inquiry into the Court's  unifying  theory in  support of these
three rulings.
Examining the votes of individual Justices  also suggests  the
real possibility that one of the most discussed  of regulatory tak-
ings  cases  in  recent  years,  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina Coastal
11.  480  U.S.  470  (1987).
12.  482  U.S.  304  (1987).
13.  483  U.S.  825  (1987).
14.  Compare Keystone  Bituminous, 480  U.S.  at 486-88  (maintaining that the state
can  exercise  its police  power  broadly  "to  accomplish  a  number  of widely varying  in-
terests"),  with  Nollan, 483  U.S.  at  836-37  (holding  that  land-use  regulation  must
"further the end  advanced  as  the justification  for the prohibition").
15.  See First English, 482  U.S.  at  314-22  (holding  that  even  temporary  takings
must be compensated).
16.  Justice  White  authored  majority  opinions  for  the  Court  in  two  cases  raising
regulatory takings  claims,  Connolly  v.  Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475  U.S.  211
(1986),  and  United States v.  Riverside Bayview  Homes, Inc., 474  U.S.  121  (1985).  He
also dissented  in  another, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates  v.  County of Yolo,  477  U.S.
340,  353  (1986).
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Council,7  no longer represents  viable precedent,  at least in the
United States Supreme Court. As in many of the regulatory tak-
ings  cases,  only  five  Justices  joined  the  Court's  majority  in
Lucas. 18  Justice White was,  again,  the decisive vote. What very
few  have  remarked  upon,  however,  is  that Justice  White  an-
nounced  his  resignation from  the Court less than  a year  after
Lucas was decided. 19
Hence, the slim Lucas majority vanished  almost upon its ar-
rival. There  are no longer five Justices on the Court who  clearly
support Justice  Scalia's rationale.  Yet, commentator  after com-
mentator insists on treating Lucas as weighty precedent,  with-
out remarking on its current vulnerability."  Lucas is, of course,
entitled to  dispositive  weight in the lower  courts.  Those  courts
are supposed  to  adhere to  Supreme  Court precedent  until it  is
modified  formally,2'  no matter  how  clear it may be that shifts
in the  Court's  composition  will  prompt its undoing  as  soon  as
the Court again addresses  the issue. The Supreme Court is not
similarly  circumscribed.22  In  the  Supreme  Court,  one  should
17.  505  U.S.  1003  (1992).
18.  The  majority  in  Lucas  consisted  of  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist  and  Justices
White,  O'Connor,  Scalia, and  Thomas.  See  id.
19.  Lucas was  decided  on  June  29,  1992,  see id.,  and Justice  White  announced his
resignation  on  March  19,  1993.  See  Linda  Greenhouse,  White Announces He'll Step
Down from High Court, N.Y.  TIMES,  Mar.  20,  1993,  at Al.
20.  A  number  of  law  review  symposia  followed  on  the  heels  of  Lucas,  none  of
which  considered  the  significance  of the  subsequent  shift  in  the  Court's  composition.
See,  e.g.,  James  E.  Brookshire,  "Taking" the  Time  To  Look  Backward, 42  CATH.  U.
L.  REv.  901  (1993);  Dennis  J. Coyle,  Takings Jurisprudence and the  Political Cul-
tures of American Politics, 42  CATH.  U.  L.  REV.  817  (1993);  John  A.  Humbach,  "Tak-
ing"  the  Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests  and Judicial
Revision  of  Legislative  Judgments,  42  CATH.  U.  L.  REV.  771  (1993);  Glynn  S.
Lunney,  Jr.,  Compensation for  Takings: How  Much  Is  Just?, 42  CATH.  U.  L.  REV.
721  (1993);  Katherine  A.  Bayne,  Note,  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council:
Drawing a Line in  the Sand, 42  CATH.  U.  L.  REV.  1063  (1993).
21.  See, e.g.,  Hutto  v. Davis,  454 U.S.  370,  375  (1982)  ("[U]nless  we wish  anarchy
to  prevail  within  the  federal judicial  system,  a  precedent  of this  Court must  be fol-
lowed  by  the  lower  federal  courts  . . . ."). There  are,  of course,  a  few  lower  court
judges  who  appear  to  exercise  a  free  hand  with  the  Supreme  Court's  precedent.  See
Francis  Wilkinson,  Judge Hand's Holy  War, AM.  LAW.,  May  1987,  at 111.
22.  See,  e.g.,  Planned  Parenthood  v. Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  854  (1992)  ("[Tlhe  rule
of stare decisis is not  an 'inexorable  command'  . . . . Rather,  when  this  Court  reex-
amines  a  prior holding,  its  judgment  is  customarily informed  by  a series  of pruden-
tial  and  pragmatic  considerations  ...  .");  see  also  Linda  Greenhouse,  High CourtCOUNTING  VOTES
expect Lucas to receive a very narrow reading.
Indeed,  the litigation  before  the  Court in Lucas reflected  a
similar development.  The  Court's  decision in Keystone Bitumi-
nous provided those defending the South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil  with  seemingly  powerful  precedent  in support  of the chal-
lenged  South Carolina  coastal  development  law. 3  The  holding
in  Keystone Bituminous seemed  unequivocal;  the Court largely
limited Pennsylvania  Coal to its facts,  concluding that a taking
had  not  occurred  and that the  state  can  properly  exercise  its
police  power "to abate  activity akin to a public  nuisance."'  All
of the litigants  before  the  Court in Lucas, however,  were  well
aware that despite its recent vintage, Keystone Bituminous was
shaky, and therefore risky, precedent upon which to rely. At the
time that Lucas was decided, the Court consisted of three Justic-
es  (Stevens,  White,  and Blackmun)  from the Keystone Bitumi-
nous majority and three (Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor) from
the  dissent. At least  two  (Thomas  and  Kennedy)  of the  three
new Justices seemed inclined to follow the Keystone Bituminous
dissenters.'  For this reason,  it  was  risky for government  law-
yers in Lucas to rely heavily on Keystone if they hoped to obtain
Justice  O'Connor's vote. Although they needed the vote  of Jus-
tice White, who was in the Keystone majority, government law-
yers  could  not afford  to alienate Justice  O'Connor.  Such alien-
ation might have resulted, however, if their advocacy left an im-
pression  that  accepting  their  argument  required  Justice
O'Connor to embrace  the Court's ruling in Keystone, from which
she recently had dissented.  Accordingly,  neither the brief filed
Asked  To Reverse Ruling in  a  Religion Case, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  31,  1996, at Al.
23.  Keystone  Bituminous  Coal  Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,  480  U.S.  470  (1987).
24.  Id.  at 488.
25.  Justice  Thomas's  speeches  and  writings  prior  to  joining  the  Court  suggested
his  strong  support  for  an aggressive  reading of the Fifth Amendment  Just  Compen-
sation  Clause,  notwithstanding  his efforts  during the  confirmation  process  to  distance
himself  from  that view.  See  Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To  Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the  United States: Hearings  Before the Senate Comm.
on  the Judiciary, 102d  Cong.  110-27  (1991).-Just  a  few  months  before  Lucas was
before  the  Court,  Justice  Kennedy  gave  a  speech  at  a  law  school  in  which  he
stressed  the  centrality of private  property  rights  under the  Federal  Constitution. See
Robert  A.  Chaim,  Justice Kennedy Inaugurates the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture
Series, MCGEORGE  MAG.,  1991,  at  10-11;  infra text  accompanying  note  39.
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by the South Carolina Coastal  Council nor the brief filed by the
United States  as anicus curiae, made Keystone a centerpiece  of
its argument.26
The  same strategic  considerations  should now be present for
any party making a regulatory  takings claim before  the current
Supreme Court. The more the party links the merits of its claim
to the Court's decision in Lucas-which is what most advocates
would  naturally do-the more  that party  would risk losing its
case before the Court. The "rule of five" is unforgiving;  you need
five votes.  There  are,  at most,  only four votes  on the current
Court  (Chief Justice  Rehnquist  and Justices  O'Connor,  Scalia,
and Thomas) to support the reasoning of the majority in Lucas.
Further,  no reason  exists  to  suppose that either  of the two
Justices  who  have joined  the  Court  since  Lucas was  decided
(Justices  Ginsburg and Breyer)  is likely  to  vote  with the  four
Justices left from the Lucas majority. Quite the opposite conclu-
sion is instead likely to be true.
In  Dolan v.  City  of Tigard, 27  a  case  that Justice  Kennedy
(who provided the fifth vote) thought was easier than Lucas for
the  plaintiff property  owner,"  Justice  Ginsburg  refused to join
the  four  Justices  left  from  the  Lucas majority.  She  instead
joined  the  dissenting  opinion  filed  by  the  same  Justices  who
dissented similarly in Lucas. 29
26.  See  Brief for  Respondent,  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.
1003  (1992)  (No.  91-453);  Brief for  the  United  States  As  Amicus  Curiae  in  Support
of Reversal,  Lucas (No.  91-453).
27.  512  U.S.  374  (1994).
28.  Although  Justice  Kennedy joined  the  majority  opinion  in Dolan, he  declined  to
do  so in Lucas, expressly stating that he  "share[d]  the  reservations" of his dissenting
colleagues,  Justices  Blackmun,  Stevens,  and  Souter,  "about  a  finding  that  a
beachfront  lot  loses  all  its  value  because  of  a  development  restriction."  Lucas, 505
U.S.  at 1034  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring  in  the judgment).
29.  See  Dolan, 512  U.S.  at  396  (Stevens,  J.,  with  whom  Blackmun  & Ginsburg,
JJ., join,  dissenting).  During  the  Senate  hearings  on  her  nomination  to  the  Court,
then-Judge  Ginsburg  was  deliberately  vague  about  her views  on  the  regulatory  tak-
ings  issue,  though  her  characterization  of  Lucas  perhaps  presaged  her  dissent  in
Dolan. Responding  to  a  question  from  Senator  Pressler, she  stated:
There  must  be  dozens  or  scores  of cases  in  which  litigants  are  seeking
clarification  of the  line  between  regulation  and  taking.  I can't  offer  now
anything  more  than  to  say  I  appreciate  that  the  'issue  is  very  much
alive,  and  that the  most  recent decision,  the Lucas decision  is hardly  the
be-all-and-end-all.COUNTING  VOTES
Although Justice Breyer has not yet participated  in  a regula-
tory takings case, his testimony on the takings issue during his
confirmation  hearings provides little comfort to future plaintiffs
bringing  regulatory  takings  claims.  Justice  Breyer  essentially
turned Pennsylvania Coal on its head. He asserted that the Tak-
ings Clause should not "go[  I  too far" so as to present obstacles
to reasonable  government regulation  of private property." 0  Like
the  dissenters  in  Dolan,"' Justice  Breyer  equated  aggressive
readings of the Takings Clause with the Lochner era, contending
that each suffers  from  a common flaw: seeking to read into the
Constitution  a  specific  economic theory.32  Justice  Breyer  main-
tained that the Constitution cannot and does not contain such a
theory. Rather, economic theories are a "function of the circum-
stances  of the moment. And if the world changes  so that it  be-
comes  crucially important to  all of us that we protect the envi-
ronment, that we protect health, that we protect safety, the Con-
stitution is not a bar to that ....
To  be sure, the  Court  does  not  abandon  precedent  routinely
whenever there is a shift in the composition of the Court. There
is properly much force in the notion  of stare  decisis, albeit less
in judicial interpretation  of the Constitution than in construction
of statutory provisions.  Much of the Court's precedent  remains
good  law,  despite  the  fact  that  it  is  likely  that today's  Court
would  approach the same issues very differently were the indi-
vidual Justices to address the issues in  the first instance.
The  Court's  regulatory  takings  precedent,  however,  exhibits
no such judicial hesitancy to strike out anew. The Court instead
routinely has ignored recent rulings. The Court also has read its
own  decisions  very  narrowly.  That  is the likely  fate  of Lucas
should  the  current  Court  revisit  the  issue.  Although  Justice
Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme  Court of
the  United States: Hearings Before  the Senate Comm.  on  the Judiciary, 103d  Cong.
238  (1993)  (statement of Judge  Ruth  Bader Ginsburg).
30.  See  S.  EXEC.  REP. No.  103-31,  at  22 (1994).
31.  See,  e.g.,  Dolan,  512  U.S.  at  406-07  (Stevens,  J.,  with  whom  Blackmun  &
Ginsburg,  JJ., join,  dissenting)  (MThe  so-called  'regulatory  takings'  doctrine  . . . has
an  obvious  kinship  with  the  line  of substantive  due  process  cases  that Lochner ex-
emplified.").
32.  See  S.  EXEc.  REP.  No.  103-31,  at 23.
33.  Id.
1107 1997]WILLIAM  AND MARY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 38:1099
Kennedy  concurred  in the judgment  of Lucas,'  which  vacated
the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings, there was a tremendous gulf between his rationale  for
doing  so  and  that  of Justice  Scalia's  majority,  which  Justice
Kennedy pointedly declined to join.
Justice Kennedy rejected in its entirety the majority's founda-
tional  claim-that  background  principles  of the  common  law,
such as  nuisance law as applied by judges, provide  an exclusive
touchstone  for  excusing  a  police  power  measure  that severely
restricts  the  use  of privately  owned  land."  Kennedy  insisted
that such common law doctrine should not be "the sole source of
state  authority to impose severe  restrictions."" 6  He  affirmative-
ly asserted that on especially fragile ecosystems a state must be
able  to restrict  development  and use  more  severely  "than the
common  law of nuisance might otherwise permit," without trig-
gering the Fifth Amendment's just compensation guarantee."
There  is no reason  to suppose that Justice  Kennedy's refusal
to join the Lucas majority was undertaken lightly. Justice Ken-
nedy is not  a Justice  who routinely writes  separate  concurring
opinions that concur only in the judgment. He does so occasion-
ally, generally joining his  conservative  colleagues'  opinions,  as
he has done in other regulatory takings cases.8
Justice Kennedy also has declared publicly his strong inclina-
tions in favor of an aggressive reading of the Fifth Amendment's
Just Compensation  Clause for the protection of private property
rights. In a speech delivered  not long before Lucas came  before
the  Court,  he  recognized  the  clash  between  the  Lockean,
prepolitical,  natural rights  conception  of private  property  and
the  Hobbesian  view  that  property  rights  emanate  exclusively
34.  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1032  (1992)  (Kenne-
dy,  J., concurring  in  the judgment).
35.  See  id.  at  1035  (Kennedy, J., concurring  in  the judgement) ("The  common  law
of nuisance  is too  narrow a confine  for the  exercise  of regulatory  power in  a complex
and  interdependent  society.").
36.  Id.
37.  Id.
38.  See,  e.g.,  Dolan  v. City  of Tigard,  512  U.S.  374,  377  (1994)  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,
writing  for  the  majority, joined  by  O'Connor,  Scalia,  Kennedy,  &  Thomas,  JJ.);  cf
Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1032  (1992)  (Kennedy,  J.,
concurring  in the judgment).
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from  the  State. 39  Justice  Kennedy  commented  specifically  on
the Court's  reluctance  since Lochner to take  an active  role  in
defending  property  rights  and speculated  that it  was time  for
the Court to return to that role to ensure that the right to pri-
vate property does not become a "second-class right": "[Piroperty
provides  the structural  vehicle  through  which  we  can  protect
ourselves  against  a blueprint  for  the future being  imposed  by
government...  ever hungry for self-aggrandizement.""
Consequently, Justice Kennedy's decision not to join the Lucas
majority, but rather to write separately, is especially significant.
The  Justices do  not pay equal  attention to all issues. As would
be expected, the Justices take greater care and spend more time
on the issues that matter most to each of them. The takings is-
sue clearly is such an issue for Justice Kennedy. He is develop-
ing a vision  of how  to resolve  the tensions  that exist between
private  property  rights  and the  police  power  of the state.  Al-
though  Justice  Kennedy  naturally  is  sympathetic  to  private
property  rights,  he  does  not  believe  that  Justice  Scalia  has
struck  the right chord  in  his  majority opinion for the Court in
Lucas. Otherwise,  as Justice  Kennedy has  done in  other cases,
he would have both joined the majority opinion and supplement-
ed his views with a concurring opinion, rather than merely con-
curring in the judgment. 41
If  one were to argue  a regulatory  takings case  before the Su-
preme Court today, it would be sensible to pay at least as much
heed  to Justice Kennedy's  concurring rationale  as  to the ratio-
nale found in  the Lucas majority opinion. It  is more likely that
the view expounded  by Justice Kennedy, not by the Lucas ma-
jority, speaks for the Court today on regulatory takings issues.
39.  See  Chaim,  supra note  25,  at  10-11.
40.  Id.
41.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Lopez,  115  S.  Ct.  1624,  1625  (1995)  (Rehnquist,
C.J.,  writing for  the  majority joined  by  O'Connor,  Scalia,  Kennedy  & Thomas,  JJ.);
id. at  1634  (Kennedy,  J., concurring).
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II.  LESSON  NUMBER TWO: THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF THE VOTES  OF
INDIVIDUAL  JUSTICES IN REVEALING  THE  CROSSCUTTING  ISSUES
BEHIND  THE  MAJORITIES AND  DISSENTS IN THE  COURT'S
DECISIONS
Commentators  often criticize Justices for voting in seemingly
anomalous  or  inconsistent  ways.42  Anomaly  and  inconsistency
are condemned  as such.43 In other  disciplines, however,  anoma-
ly presents  a positive opportunity.  In science,  for example, the
discovery  of an  anomaly-an  observation  that does  not square
with established theory--can be a moment of celebration and not
despair.  Anomaly  presents  a possible  window  for fuller under-
standing of a phenomenon being studied."  Physicists  developed
the theory of relativity  and quantum  mechanics  because  of the
increasing failure of Newtonian  classic mechanics  to explain ex-
perimental  observations  such  as  the  photoelectric  effect.45  In
evolutionary biology,  some believe that the genetic anomaly can
provide the impetus for species adaptation and advance.46
Anomaly can be similarly useful in identifying the motivations
behind  the Justices'  voting in  unexpected  ways.  Rather  than
calling for conclusory criticism, the unexpected vote can be seen
42.  See,  e.g.,  Douglas  Laycock,  The  Death of  the  Irreparable Injury  Rule,  103
HARV.  L.  REV.  687,  756-57  (1990);  Betsy  Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The
Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School,  95  YALE  L.J.
1647,  1658-60  (1986);  The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107  HARV.  L.
REV.  144,  270  (1993);  The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103  HARV.  L.
REV.  137,  326  (1989).
43.  But see  Christopher  J.  Peters,  Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and
Justice, 105  YALE  L.J.  2031,  2113  (1996)  ("[Olur  courts  finally  must  rid  themselves
of the habit of thinking that  adjudicative  consistency holds  some  inherent value  tug-
ging  them  away  from what is just.").
44.
Discovery  commences  with  the  awareness  of anomaly,  i.e., with  the  recog-
nition  that  nature  has  somehow  violated  the  paradigm-induced  expecta-
tions  that  govern  normal  science.  It then  continues  with  a  more  or  less
extended  exploration  of the  area  of anomaly. And  it closes  only'when the
paradigm  theory  has  been  adjusted  so  that  the  anomalous  has  become
the  expected.
THOMAs  S.  KUHN,  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  SCIENTIFIC  REVOLUTIONS  52-53  (2d  ed.  1970).
45.  See  RICHARD  FEYNMAN,  THE  CHARACTER  OF  PHYSICAL  LAw  162-63  (1965);  see
also id. at  158  ("In other  words  we  are  trying  to  prove  ourselves  wrong  as  quickly
as  possible, because  only in  that way can we  find progress.").
46.  See  STEPHEN  JAY  GOULD,  THE  PANDA'S  THUMB  186-93  (1980).
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as a window revealing the factors likely to prompt an individual
Justice to vote one way rather than another in  a regulatory tak-
ings case. It is instructive to determine what competing  consid-
eration  sufficed  to  warrant  abandoning  apparently  consistent
decision making. 7 To that end, this portion of the Essay identi-
fies voting patterns of several Justices. Each Justice is discussed
separately. Of special emphasis in this Essay are any votes that
might seem counterintuitive  or otherwise  surprising. Their sur-
prising nature  makes  them potentially  the most  revealing.  In
particular,  they may suggest that those crosscutting issues un-
derlying the regulatory  takings  debate play a far larger role in
influencing the Court's rulings than has been expressly acknowl-
edged by the opinions themselves.
A.  The Unexpected in Justice Voting
Justice White is the easy case for highlighting vote shifting in
the Court's  regulatory  takings  cases.48  He  is,  however,  hardly
alone. With the exception of Justice  Scalia, there is a surprising
amount of movement in how individual Justices vote in  regulato-
ry takings  cases  on the  Court.  Surveyed  below  are  the voting
patterns  of Justice Brennan and several of the current Justices,
other than Justice Kennedy, who have played significant roles in
the Court's takings jurisprudence during the past two decades.
1.  Chief Justice  Rehnquist
Many would assume that Chief Justice Rehnquist has adhered
to  a fairly steady line  of decision in takings  cases.  Not  so. Al-
though one can fairly characterize the Chief Justice as generally
sympathetic  to the claims  of private property  owners, his writ-
ings  and votes  are not without  qualification  and  some judicial
backtracking.
For instance, in Kaiser Aetna v.  United States, 49  then-Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court in which he declared
47.  Cf. John  E.  Coons,  Consistency, 75  CAL.  L.  REv.  59,  112-13  (1987)  ("[Ilncon-
sistency's  most  compelling  claim  for  recognition  may  lie  in  its  potential  service  to
truth.").
48.  See  supra note  16  and  accompanying  text.
49.  444 U.S.  164  (1979).
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the "fundamental" 'nature of the property  owner's  "right to ex-
clude."0  The  Court  ruled  in  Kaiser Aetna  that  the  federal
government's insistence  on public access  to  a navigable private
marina  constituted  a  taking  of property  requiring  compensa-
tion.5   Just  a  few  months  later,  however,  then-Justice
Rehnquist  authored  a  unanimous  opinion  for  the  Court  in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins. 52  In that case, the Court
ruled that the "right to exclude" was not fundamental to a shop-
ping center owner who had failed to demonstrate that his ability
to  exclude  certain  leafleteers  was  "essential to the  use  or eco-
nomic value of [his]  property ....  53
Similarly, contrasts  exist between the opinion that the  Chief
Justice  wrote  for  the  Court  in Dolan v.  City  of Tigard'  and
Justice  Scalia's  opinion  for  the  Court  in Nollan v.  California
Coastal Commission. 55  The tone  of Dolan is decidedly different
from the one that Justice Scalia set for the Court in Nollan. The
Dolan opinion  is  discernibly  more  tempered,  more  deferential,
and ultimately more respectful of the workings of, and necessity
for, state  and  local  land-use  regulation. 56  In  this  respect,  the
Dolan opinion may share some  common roots with PruneYard,
which rests similarly on notions  of federalism  and the primacy
of state law for the definition of private property rights. 57
PruneYard is not the only case in which the Chief Justice sid-
ed  with  the  government  in  a  takings  case.  He joined  Justice
Brennan's  opinion  for  the  Court  in Andrus  v.  Allard,"  which
50.  Id. at  179-80.
51.  See  id. at 180.
52.  447  U.S.  74  (1980).
53.  Id. at  84.
54.  512  U.S.  374  (1994).
55.  483  U.S.  825  (1987).
56.  See,  e.g.,  Dolan, 512  U.S.  at  387  ("No  ...gimmicks  are  associated  with the
permit  conditions  imposed  by  the  city  in  this  case.");  id. at  396  ("Cities  have  long
engaged  in  the  commendable  task  of land  use planning,  made  necessary  by increas-
ing  urbanization  particularly  in  metropolitan  areas  such  as  Portland.  The  city's
goals  ...are  laudable,  but  there are  outer  limits  on  how  this  may  be done.").
57.  PruneYard, 447  U.S.  at  84-85  (referring  to  the "residual  authority  [of a  State]
that  enables  it  to  define  'property'  in  the  first  instance"  and  "the  State's  asserted
interest  in  promoting  more  expansive  rights  of  free  speech  and  petition  than  con-
ferred  by  the  Federal  Constitution").
58.  444 U.S.  51  (1979).
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used very  strong  proregulation  rhetoric  in  rejecting  a takings
challenge to the Eagle  Protection Act59  and the Migratory  Bird
Treaty  Act,'  both of which  restricted  the sale  of eagle  feath-
ers."' Rehnquist  also joined  Justice  Blackmun's  majority  opin-
ion for the  Court in Ruckelshaus v.  Monsanto Co.,62  which re-
jected  most, but not all, of a takings claim brought against the
Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA) based on  trade  secret
disclosure  requirements  under the  Federal  Insecticide,  Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act.'
This  past Term,  in Bennis v.  Michigan," the  Chief Justice,
writing for  a slim five-Justice  majority,  dismissively rejected  a
plaintiffs  claim that a state criminal forfeiture law amounted to
an unconstitutional  taking of private property.'  In  Bennis, the
plaintiff herself had committed no crime, yet she lost her title to
an automobile that she and her husband owned jointly when he
had used the automobile in  the crime of soliciting a prostitute.'
Employing  somewhat  elliptical  reasoning,  the  Chief  Justice's
opinion for the Court tersely stated that "[tihe government  may
not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has
already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental au-
thority other than the power of eminent domain." 7
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the role of nuisance
law in takings  analysis has shifted significantly  over the years.
In  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.  DeBenedictis,'  Rehnquist
wrote in his dissent that "our cases have never applied the nui-
sance  exception  to  allow  complete  extinction  of the value  of a
parcel  of property." 69  That claim is inconsistent with his earlier
dissenting statement in Penn Central Transportation  Co. v. New
59.  16  U.S.C.  § 668(a)  (1994).
60.  Id.  §  703.
61.  See Allard, 444 U.S.  at 67-68.
62.  467  U.S.  986  (1984).
63.  7  U.S.C.  §§  136-136y  (1994);  see Ruckleshaus, 467  U.S.  at  1013-14.
64.  116 S.  Ct.  994  (1996).
65.  See  id. at 1001.
66.  See  id. at 996.
67.  Id.  at  1001.
68.  480  U.S.  470  (1987).
69.  Id. at  513.
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York  City 7"  that the  Court's  precedent  established  "two excep-
tions  [to the Takings Clause]  where the destruction of property
does not constitute a taking," 71 one of which was when the "for-
bidden use is  dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare  of oth-
ers." 72 Significantly,  Chief Justice Rehnquist  did not equate the
nuisance  exception to common law precedent but seemed to  al-
low for more broadly based exercises of the police power restrict-
ing  such dangerous  uses  of property."  More recently, however,
the Chief Justice joined the majority opinion in Lucas v.  South
Carolina Coastal Council, 74  which  rejected  both  his  Keystone
Bituminous analysis  by  embracing  a  nuisance  exception7 5  and
his Penn Central analysis  by seeming  to limit the nuisance  ex-
ception to judicial application of the common law.76
2.  Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan was generally a reliable vote for the govern-
ment  in  regulatory  takings  cases,  just  as  Chief  Justice
Rehnquist was generally a reliable vote against the government.
As  with  the  Chief  Justice,  however,  factors  could  arise  that
would  prompt Justice Brennan  to  change  his usual voting pat-
tern. To the great dismay of government regulators and environ-
mentalists, Justice Brennan sided with those favoring a consti-
tutionally required money damage remedy in his dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.  City of San Diego, 77 a case in which
the majority invoked  procedural  grounds  to  avoid reaching.the
ultimate  issue.7"  It was  not  long  before  property  owners  real-
ized the potential for victory that Justice Brennan's  realignment
promised,  in  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church  v.
70.  438  U.S.  104  (1978).
71.  Id.  at  144.
72.  Id.  at  145.
73.  See  id.  ("The  nuisance  exception  to  the  taking  guarantee  is  not  coterminous
with  the  police  power  itself.").
74.  505  U.S.  1003  (1992).
75.  See id.  at  1027-32.
76.  See  id.  at  1029.
77.  450  U.S.  621,  653  (1981)  (Brennan,  J.,  with  whom  Stewart,  Marshall,  &
Powell,  JJ., join,  dissenting).
78.  See id.  at  631-33.
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County of Los Angeles. 79
To  be  sure,  one  can  posit  a  distinction  between  the  Fifth
Amendment remedy issue and the threshold issue of whether a
regulation effects a taking in the first instance. Justice Stevens,
however,  has  the better  argument in contending  that the two
issues  cannot  be  divided  so  neatly.0  Justice  Brennan's  view
that there must be  a remedy for temporary  takings  reflects  an
intolerance toward government interference with property rights
that is  at  odds with  the  legal  theory  underlying  the  opinions
that he  joined  and  authored  rejecting  takings  claims  on  the
merits.8' The temporal restrictions that Justice Brennan agreed
mandate just compensation do not differ fundamentally from the
spatial restrictions that he concluded  do not mandate compensa-
tion.82  In a less  charitable  moment in his  dissent  in Nollan v.
California Coastal  Commission,'  Justice  Stevens  chastised
Justice Brennan for failing to perceive the inconsistency and, in
Justice Stevens's view, unfairly subjecting land-use regulation to
unrealistic constitutional standards."
79.  482  U.S.  304  (1987)  (holding  that  the  government  must compensate  property
owners  for a  temporary  taking).
80.  See id. at  328-35  (Stevens,  J., dissenting).
81.  See  id. at  330-31  (Stevens, J., dissenting)  (discussing Keystone Bituminous and
Penn Central).
82.  See  id  at  330  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  ("Regulations  are  three  dimensional;
They have  depth, width,  and length....  It  is obvious that no  one  of these  elements
can  be  analyzed  alone  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  a regulation,  and  hence  to  deter-
mine whether  a taking  has occurred.").
83.  483  U.S.  825,  866  (1987).
84.
I write  today to  identify the  severe  tension between  [the decision  in First
English] and  the  view  expressed  by  JUSTICE  BRENNAN's  dissent  in  this
case  that  the  public  interest  is  served  by  encouraging  state  agencies  to
exercise  considerable  flexibility  in responding  to  private  desires  for  devel-
opment  in  a  way  that  threatens  the  preservation  of  public  resources.  I
like  the hat that JUSTICE  BRENNAN  has  donned  today better than the  one
he  wore  in San Diego, and I am persuaded  that he has the better of the
legal  arguments  here.  Even  if his  position  prevailed  in  this case,  howev-
er,  it would  be  of little  solace  to  land-use  planners  who  would  still  be
left  guessing  about  how  the  Court  will  react  to  the  next  case,  and  the
one  after  that.  As this case  demonstrates,  the rule  of liability  created  by
the  Court in First English is  a shortsighted  one.  Like  JUSTICE  BRENNAN,
I hope  that a  "broader vision ultimately  prevails."
Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins, dissenting) (citations omitted).WILLIAM AND  MARY LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  38:1099
3.  Justice Stevens
Justice Brennan did not respond to Justice Stevens's criticism
of him  in Nollan. Had Justice  Brennan  chosen  to  respond  in
kind, he certainly  could have reminded Justice  Stevens that his
own record did not reflect a wholly steady view in takings cases.
Justice Stevens has authored more opinions than most Justices
have in favor of government regulators in takings cases, writing
the majority opinion in Keystone Bituminous, concurring in the
judgment in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v.  Hamilton Bank,"  and  dissenting  in First English, Nollan,
Lucas, and Dolan. Many  forget,  however,  that Justice  Stevens
joined then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, having
declined to join Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court.
Justice Stevens likewise joined the majority ruling in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV  Corp.s  that a  taking  had  oc-
curred, 7  again  declining  to  join  Justice  Brennan  in  dissent."
In Loretto, Justice  Stevens  embraced  a per  se approach  to the
takings issue  that presaged  a mode  of analysis that he subse-
quently criticized  as unduly  rigid when the  Court extended its
application  in Lucas.9
4.  Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor's views exhibit more consistency than many
of the other members of the Court.  She has tended to be among
the  most  aggressive  in  her  defense  of private  property rights.
She joined the  dissenters  in Keystone Bituminous, and the ma-
jority in Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Unlike her voting tendencies
in other  areas  of constitutional  law,"  she  declined  to join  Jus-
85.  473  U.S.  172,  202  (1985).
86.  458 U.S.  419,  420  (1982).
87.  See  id.  at  441-42.
88.  See id.  at  442.
89.  Compare id.  at 434-35  ("[Wlhen the 'character  of the governmental action,'...  is
a permanent  physical occupation  of property,  our cases  uniformly have  found a taking
to  the extent  of the occupation,  without regard  to  whether the  action  achieves  an im-
portant  public  health  benefit  or  has  only  minimal  economic  impact  on  the  owner."),
with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,  505 U.S.  1003,  1071  (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("'[Flairess and justice' are often disserved  by categorical rules.").
90.  See,  e.g.,  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v. Pena,  115  S.  Ct. 2097  (1995);  Planned
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tice Kennedy's effort in Lucas to set forth a more moderate con-
stitutional  vision  of the Fifth Amendment.  Perhaps  even  more
revealing, Justice  O'Connor has in recent years twice taken the
unusual step of formally dissenting from denials  of certiorari in
regulatory takings  cases in which aggrieved  landowners  sought
the Court's  review.91  Justices  generally  do  not  formally record
their dissents from denial of certiorari.  Doing so, therefore,  un-
derscores the depth and intensity of the Justice's views.
If there are  any surprises  in Justice  O'Connor's  voting pat-
tern, they are likely to be found in her position on the remedy
issue. On this issue, her votes to some extent are the mirror im-
age  of Justice  Brennan's.  In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo,92 Justice  O'Connor joined Justice  Stevens's ma-
jority,  which  declined  to  reach  the  remedy  issue."  Then,  in
First  English, Justice O'Connor joined parts of Justice Stevens's
dissent,  which  expressed  both  concern  about  respecting  state
courts'  and skepticism  about the  merits  of the threshold  tak-
ings  claim. 95 In First  English, the landowner  challenged  a law
that restricted its ability to operate  a camp for the disabled  in
an  area  that  the  government  deemed  unsafe  because  of the
threat of flooding. 6 Review of the oral argument reveals Justice
O'Connor's concern with the dangers of such a use of the proper-
ty. 7 That same concern  also may have provided the impetus  for
Justice Scalia's  assertion  in the majority opinion in Lucas that
Parenthood  v. Casey,  505  U.S.  833  (1992).
91.  See  Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta,  115 S.  Ct. 2268  (1995)  (Thomas, J., with
whom  O'Connor,  J., joins,  dissenting);  Stevens  v.  City  of  Cannon  Beach,  510  U.S.
1207  (1994)  (Scalia,  J., with whom  O'Connor,  J., joins, dissenting).
92.  477  U.S.  340  (1986).
93.  See  id. at  348-53.
94.  See  First English  Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  v. County  of Los  Angeles,  482
U.S.  304,  335-39  (1987)  (Stevens,  J.,  with  whom  Blackmun  &  O'Connor,  JJ., join,
dissenting  as  to Parts  I and  III).
95.  See  id. at  322-28  (Stevens,  J.,  with  whom  Blackmun  &  O'Connor,  JJ., join,
dissenting  as  to Parts  I and  III).
96.  See id. at 307-08.
97.  See  Official  Transcript  Proceedings  Before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United
States  at  26,  First English (No.  85-1199)  [hereinafter  First English Oral  Argument
Transcript]  (questions  posed  by Justice  O'Connor) ("[D]o  you  think that  local  govern-
ments  don't  have  authority  to  engage  in  flood control  regulation?  . . . And  does the
church  plan to  rebuild  on  a flood plain  where  people have  been  killed?").
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prohibiting  development  that  would  flood  another's  property
could destroy all economic value without constituting a taking of
property."  Because  Justice  O'Connor  supplied  Justice  Scalia
with the  crucial  fifth vote  in Lucas, Justice  Scalia  may  have
been responding to Justice Brennan's  "rule of five."
5.  Justice Scalia
No one could contend that Justice Scalia has not adhered to a
firm  position  in the  regulatory  takings  cases. Property  owners
have  no  greater  ally  on  the  Court.  He  opposed  the  property
owner's  loss in Keystone Bituminous10  and voted with the ma-
jority  in  support  of private  property  rights  in  First English,
Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Not coincidentally, his majority opin-
ions  for  the  Court in  both Nollan and Lucas included  some  of
the most sweeping and potentially far-reaching rhetoric promot-
ing  Fifth  Amendment  protection  of  private  property  rights
against governmental  encroachment.''
To discover the revealing anomalies  in Justice  Scalia's votes,
one must look beyond the regulatory takings  cases. When  other
members  of the Court have wavered somewhat in takings cases
in response  to competing concerns,  Justice Scalia alone has not.
By not doing so, however, he necessarily has produced some ten-
sion between his takings jurisprudence and his opinions in other
areas  of constitutional  law. Missing from Justice Scalia's  analy-
sis  in the takings  cases  is his  typical  concern  that  courts  not
98.  See Lucas  v. South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505. U.S.  1003,  1029  (1992).
99.  See supra note  7  and  accompanying  text.
100.  480  U.S.  470,  506  (1987)  (Rehnquist,  C.J.,  dissenting).
101.
We  view  the  Fifth  Amendment's  Property  Clause  to  be  more  than  a
pleading  requirement,  and  compliance  with  it  to  be  more  than  an exer-
cise  in  cleverness  and  imagination.  As  indicated  earlier,  our  cases  de-
scribe  the  condition  for abridgement  of property  rights  through  the  police
power  as  a  "Substantial advanc[ing]"  of  a  legitimate  state  interest.  We
are inclined  to  be  particularly  careful  about  the adjective  where  the actu-
al conveyance  of property  is  made  a  condition  to  the  lifting  of a land-use
restriction,  since  in that  context there is  heightened  risk that the  purpose
is  avoidance  of the  compensation  requirement,  rather  than the  stated  po-
lice-power  objective.
Nollan  v.  California  Coastal  Comm'n,  483  U.S.  825,  841  (1987).
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invoke the Constitution to upsef laws enacted by the democrati-
cally  elected  legislative branch."2  Gone is his  normal penchant
for restricting  the  meaning  of the  Constitution  to the original
intent  of the  Framers.' 3  Likewise,  remarkably  absent  is  any
concern with federal  courts invoking the federal Constitution  to
override the judgments  of state and local governments-a feder-
alism concern.'"'
B.  The Crosscutting  Issues
There  are, of course,  many possible explanations  for Justices
shifting their views in regulatory takings cases.  One very likely
possibility is that the individual  Justices  are not nearly  as  ob-
sessive  as  academics  suppose  them  to  be  about  the  precise
meaning  of every  specific  word or  phrase in the  opinions  that
they write or join. Commentators, therefore, are mistaken if they
believe  that  they  gain  tremendous  insight  into  a  particular
Justice's thinking by performing  such word  parsing.  The  opin-
ions are often a joint product, very much the result of collabora-
tive  efforts  among the  Justice, his  or her  law  clerks,  and  the
views  of  other  chambers. 5  When  the  opinion  is  one  for  the
Court or for  several Justices joining in a separate  opinion,  ac-
commodation of competing views is necessary. 6
102.  See  Humbach,  supra note  20,  at  771-72;  see  also  ROBERT  H.  BORK,  THE
TEMPTING  OF  AMIERICA:  THE  POLITICAL  SEDUCTION  OF  THE  LAW  229-30  (1990)  (criti-
cizing Richard  Epstein's reading of the Fifth Amendment's  Just Compensation  Clause
as  permitting judicial  usurpation  of legislative judgment).
103.  See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists:  A Critical  Comparison  of Jus-
tices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV.  25,  61-63 (1994);  see also BORK, supra note  102,
at 230  ("My difficulty  is not that Epstein's  constitution would repeal  much of the New
Deal and the modem regulatory-welfare  state but rather that these conclusions are not
plausibly related to the original understanding of the takings clause.").
104.  See  Frank I. Michelman,  Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:  A  Comment
on Lucas and Judicial  Conservatism, 35 WM.  & MARY  L. REV. 301,  307, 310-28  (1993).
105.  See  Charles  W.  Collier,  The  Use  and Abuse  of Humanistic Theory  in Law:
Reexamining the Assumptions  of Interdisciplinary  Legal  Scholarship, 41  DUKE  L.J.
191,  229-30  (1991)  ("Supreme  Court  opinions  are  becoming  less  . . . the  product  of
an individual  and powerful  mind, less  an original  text  or primary  source providing  a
theoretical  model  for  scholarship,  and  more  the  product  of 'bureaucratic  writing'  by
law clerks....  They  are  the  proverbial 'work  of many  hands.'").
106.  See  Kevin  M.  Stack, Note,  The Practice of Dissent in  the Supreme Court, 105
YALE  L.J. 2235,  2239  (1996).
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The Justices  also react  to the facts  of the cases  before  them
based on their own life experiences.  There may be no conscious
or even desired  effort to  develop  a coherent unifying legal posi-
tion.  Consider,  for  example,  Justice  Powell's  sympathy for the
historic preservation regulation challenged in Penn Central and
his  hostility  toward  restrictions  on  coal  mining  challenged  in
Keystone  Bituminous.°7   Justice  Powell's  contrasting  votes
might  reflect  nothing  more  than  his  appreciation  for  historic
preservation and coal. Each is well established in his home state
of Virginia, where  one finds both  Colonial Williamsburg  and  a
heavy economic dependence  on coal mining."8
The votes of the Justices, however,  also suggest the crosscut-
ting issues in regulatory takings cases.  No case before the Court
exists in a vacuum removed from the Court's other precedent. A
Justice's vote in a case before the Court does not turn simply on
the particular facts before the Court. Nor does a Justice consider
the  regulatory  takings  issue  in  isolation.  A  Justice  inevitably
considers  the relationship  of the  Court's resolution  of the issue
at hand to  other, broader issues that recur frequently in differ-
ent  substantive  areas  of the  Court's  varied  docket.  These  so-
called "crosscutting" issues provide the common threads between
rulings and, ultimately, the fabric  of the jurisprudence  of a sin-
gle Justice.
What makes  the Court's takings jurisprudence  so susceptible
to vote  shifting is the way that those crosscutting issues tug at
individual members in an  oppositional fashion in takings cases.
"Oppositional" in this context refers to a crosscutting issue's ten-
dency to push a Justice toward voting in a way contrary to what
otherwise might be his or her natural inclination on the primary
legal issue before the Court.
107.  Cf. Official  Transcript  Proceedings  Before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United
States  at  46,  Hodel  v.  Indiana,  452  U.S.  314  (1981)  (No.  80-231)  (statement  of Jus-
tice  Powell)  (expressing  his  concern,  Justice  Powell  stated  that  because  of  the  geo-
graphic characteristics  of Virginia,  "in many  instances  the land  ha[s]  no  value what-
ever under  the  administration  of  [a surface  mining control  law]").
108.  Justice  Kennedy's  surprising  vote  in Lucas may  reflect  his  appreciation,  based
on  years  of  living  in  California,  of  the  hidden  perils  of  residential  development  in
potentially  unstable  ecosystems.  See  Richard  J. Lazarus,  Putting the  Correct 'Spin"
on Lucas,  45  STAN.  L.  REV.  1411,  1422-23  (1993).
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For example, a Justice like Scalia naturally might be inclined
to  uphold an  executive branch  agency's  effort to  make environ-
mental  regulations  less demanding  and  costly to industry, but
nonetheless  might feel equally  compelled  to  reject the  agency's
effort based on the plain meaning  of the statutory language. His
overriding commitment to "plain meaning" construction of statu-
tory  language  would  probably  trump  any  pro-business,
antiregulatory inclinations that he might harbor."9
In regulatory takings cases, there are a substantial number of
crosscutting issues that have just such oppositional  tendencies.
These issues may well explain much of the vote shifting that has
occurred. Even more importantly, however, they may suggest the
roots  of compromise  necessary for  the establishment  of a new
majority coalition on the Court on the regulatory takings issue.
1.  Original  Intent or Understanding
The Justices routinely debate the significance and meaning of
the Framers' original intent or understanding in deciding issues
of constitutional  law."0  The basic notion that the  Court should
109.  In  City of Chicago v.  Environmental Defense Fund, 511  U.S.  328  (1994),  Jus-
tice  Scalia  wrote  an opinion  for  the  Court that  rejected  the  EPA's  interpretation  of
the  Resource  Conservation  and  Recovery  Act  which  would  have  allowed  municipali-
ties to  exempt  from  costly hazardous  waste  management  regulations  the  ash  gener-
ated  from the  combustion  of municipal  waste  to  produce  energy.  See  id. at  334-35.
The  majority  ruled  that  the  meaning  of the  statutory  language  was  plain  and  de-
clined  to  rely  on  any contrary  legislative history. See  id. at  337  ("[Ilt is  the statute,
and  not  the  Committee  Report,  which  is  the  authoritative  expression  of  the
law . . . .").  Justice  Scalia's  penchant  for plain  meaning  construction  of statutes  and
his antipathy  for  legislative history are well  established. See Antonin  Scalia,  Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations  of Law,  1989  DUKE  L.J.  511,  517;  James
J.  Brudney,  Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93  MICH. L.  REV.  1, 41-42  (1994).
110.  See,  e.g.,  U.S.  Term  Limits,  Inc.  v. Thornton,  115  S.  Ct.  1842  (1995)  (holding
unconstitutional  a state  constitutional  provision  limiting  the  number  of federal  con-
gressional  terms  an  individual  can  serve);  United  States  v.  Lopez,  115  S.  Ct.  1624
(1995)  (holding  that  a  gun  control  law  exceeded  Congress's  authority  to  regulate
commerce  under  the  Constitution).  The  body  of legal  scholarship  on  original  intent
and  its  applications  also  continues  to  grow.  See  RAOUL  BERGER,  GOVERNMENT  BY
JUDICIARY  363-72  (1977);  BORK,  supra note  102,  at  143-259;  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  THE
PARTIAL  CONSTITUTION  93-161  (1993);  Paul  Brest,  The  Misconceived  Quest for  the
Original Understanding,  60 B.U.  L. REV.  204  (1980);  H.  Jefferson  Powell,  The Origi-
nal Understanding  of Original Intent, 98 HARv.  L.  REV.  885  (1985).
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tie the meaning of the Constitution  more  closely to  original in-
tent  is  more  favored  by  members  of the  Court identified  fre-
quently  as  conservatives  than by those  members  identified  as
liberals."'  As  applied to  regulatory takings  cases,  however,  the
issue of original intent wreaks  havoc on what might  otherwise
be natural coalitions within the Court."'
The original intent argument generally favors those resisting
regulatory  takings  claims  against  environmental  and land-use
regulation.  Little historical  evidence  exists  to  support  the view
that  the  Framers  contemplated  that  the  Just  Compensation
Clause  would  restrict  nonphysically  invasive  police  power  re-
strictions  on the  use of private property."'  Consequently,  sup-
porters  of land-use  and  environmental  regulation  quickly  find
themselves  securing  the  flag  of  original  intent  around  their
cause,"4  and  conservatives,  concerned  about unduly prohibitive
restrictions  on private property, find themselves  voicing the ex-
pansive  constitutional  rhetoric  that  they  roundly  condemned
when  previously invoked  on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs  and
criminal defendants."5
111.  See  Lopez,  115  S.  Ct.  at  1643-46  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring);  William  H.
Rehnquist,  The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEL  L.  REV.  693  (1976);  Antonin
Scala,  Originalism:  The  Lesser Evil, 57  U.  CIN.  L.  REV.  849  (1989).
112.  The  "liberal" and  "conservative"  labels are  extraordinarily  imprecise  in describ-
ing  the  Justices  and  potentially  misleading  with  regard  to  the  regulatory  takings
issue  given  the  ties of property  rights  proponents  to  Lockean  liberalism.  I  nonethe-
less  use  these  labels  in  this  Essay  for  lack  of  an  alternative  shorthand  expression
for  describing  the  predilections  of the Justices  on certain  crosscutting  issues.
113.  See  J.  Peter Byrne,  Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22  ECOLOGY  L.Q.  89,  91-96  (1995);  William  Michael  Treanor,  The  Original
Understanding of the  Takings  Clause and the Political Process, 95  COLUM.  L.  REV.
782,  785-97  (1995);  see  also John  F.  Hart, Colonial Land  Use Law  and Its Signifi-
cance for Modern Takings  Doctrine, 109  HARV.  L.  REV.  1252,  1289-93  (1996)  ("The
reason  the  Framers  did  not  address  land  use  regulation  in  the  Takings  Clause  is
that they  did  not regard  it  as  a  taking.").  But see Douglas  W.  Kmiec,  The  Original
Understanding  of the Taking Clause Is  Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88  CoLUM.  L. REV.
1630,  1635  (1988).
114.  See  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1055-60  (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115.  See  Dolan v.  City of Tigard,  512  U.S.  374,  392  (1994)  ("We  see no  reason why
the Takings  Clause  of the Fifth Amendment,  as  much a part of the Bill of Rights  as
the  First  Amendment  or  Fourth  Amendment,  should  be  relegated  to  the  status  of
poor  relation  in  these  comparable  circumstances.");  Lucas, 505  U.S.  at 1028  &  n.15
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2. Federalism
A similar reversal  of positions  occurs when one relates feder-
alism  concerns  to  the  regulatory  takings  issue.  For  example,
those  who  support  environmental  protection  laws that promote
national  environmental  protection  objectives  have  not  shied
away from overriding  state and local prerogatives.116  Conserva-
tive  activists,  scholars,  and judges,  however,  have  decried  the
subjugation  of state  and  local  governments  to  national  inter-
ests.17 Indeed, the very name  of the most prominent of conser-
vative legal think tanks-The Federalist Society--expresses that
baseline position." 1
Each  side,  however,  must display  some  legal  gymnastics  in
addressing the regulatory takings issue. Conservatives  trumpet
the need for federal courts to invoke the federal Constitution to
override  state  and  local  legislative  enactments."'  Liberals,
however,  discover  the  sanctity  of state  and local  autonomy  in
finding no merit to takings challenges  and in emphasizing that
braced  regulations  of property at  all" and  relying  on the  "historical  compact recorded
in the  Takings  Clause that has become  part  of our  constitutional  culture").
116.  See  Adam  Babich,  Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good For-
tune, 54  MD.  L.  REV.  1516,  1534-50  (1995);  John P.  Dwyer, The Practice of Federal-
ism  Under the Clean Air Act,  54  MD.  L.  REV.  1183,  1190-99  (1995);  Jim Florio, Fed-
eralism Issues Related  to  the  Probable Emergence of the  Toxic  Substances Control
Act,  54  MD.  L.  REV.  1354,  1363-70  (1995);  Oliver  A.  Houck  & Michael  Rolland,  Fed-
eralism in  Wetlands Regulation: A  Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act
Section  404  and Related  Programs to  the  States,  54  MD.  L.  REV.  1242,  1244-53
(1995);  Robert  V.  Percival,  Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contem-
porary Models, 54  MD.  L.  REV.  1141,  1157-65  (1995).
117.  See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's  Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding,  94 MIcH. L. REV.  615,  618-26  (1995).
118.  See  Richard  Neely,  The  Politics of Patronage:  Empowering Joe Lunchbucket, 4
CORNELL  J.L. &  PUB.  POLY  525,  525  (1995)  ("The  Federalist Society  focuses on shift-
ing  the  level  of government  decision-making  from the  federal  government  to state or
local  government  .
119.
We  realize  that even  our present  holding will undoubtedly lessen  to  some
extent the freedom  and flexibility  of land-use  planners and  governing bod-
ies of municipal corporations  when enacting land-use  regulations.  But such
consequences  necessarily  flow  from  any decision upholding  a  claim of con-
stitutional right; many of the provisions  of the  Constitution are designed  to
limit the  flexibility and freedom  of governmental authorities  ....
First  English Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  v.  County  of Los  Angeles,  482  U.S.  304,
321  (1987).
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property rights are defined in the first instance by state law. 2 '
3.  Judicial  Activism
Related  notions  of judicial  activism play out similarly in  the
regulatory takings  cases.  Liberals who tend to be the targets of
complaints  asserting that they support "government by judicia-
ry "121  now  launch  that  same  claim  at  conservatives  who  pro-
mote  aggressive application of the Just Compensation Clause.
122
Similarly, conservatives,  apparently  enjoying  a convenient bout
of  temporary  amnesia,  enthusiastically  turn  to  the  courts  to
champion their vision of wise social and economic policy."2
4.  Government Distrust
A fourth crosscutting issue relates  to distrust  of government
and individual autonomy. This is an especially  problematic fea-
ture  of regulatory takings  disputes.  Liberals  and  conservatives
alike exhibit distrust of government, albeit in different contexts.
Regulatory  takings  claims, however,  can bridge  that gap  capa-
bly,  allowing  both  groups  to  concern  themselves  with  possible
120.
[The  doctrine  of  exhaustion]  is  supported  by  our  respect  for  the  sover-
eignty  of the  several  States  and by  our  interest  in  having federal judges
decide  federal  constitutional  issues  only  on  the  basis  of fully  developed
records.  The  States'  interest  in  controlling  land-use  development  and  in
exploring  all  the  ramifications  of  a  challenge  to  a  zoning  restriction
should  command  the  same  deference  from  the  federal judiciary.
Id.  at  338  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  (citations  omitted);  see  also Lucas, 505  U.S.  at
1051  (Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting)  ("These  cases  rest  on  the  principle  that the  State
has  full power  to prohibit  an owner's  use of property if it is harmful  to  the  public.");
Byrne,  supra note  113,  at  111-15  (describing  the  damage  resulting  from judicial  in-
trusion  into state  property  law).
121.  See  BERGER,  supra note  110;  BORIr,  supra note  102.
122.  See  Dolan v.  City of Tigard,  512  U.S.  374,  407  (1994)  (Stevens,  J., dissenting)
(describing  both  Lochner  and  the  "'regulatory  takings'  doctrine"  as  "having  similar
ancestry"  and  as  "potentially open-ended  sources  of judicial  power  to  invalidate state
economic  regulations  that  Members  of this Court view  as  unwise  or  unfair");  Lucas,
505  U.S.  at  1046  (Blackmun, J., dissenting)  ("The  Court  offers  no justification  for its
sudden  hostility  toward  state legislators,  and I doubt  that it  could.");  Nollan  v.  Cali-
fornia  Coastal  Comm'n,  483  U.S.  825,  846  (1987)  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting)  ("[The
Court's]  narrow conception  of rationality, however,  has  long since  been discredited  as
a judicial  arrogation  of legislative  authority.").
123.  See  Byrne,  supra note  113,  at  118-19.
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governmental abuses.
Distrust of government provides much of the driving force be-
hind  the  property  rights  movement.  Justice  Holmes  long  ago
spoke of the tendency of government, if left unchecked, to define
away  property rights."  Richard  Epstein has written  openly  of
the need for the courts to invoke the Fifth Amendment to guard
against  majoritarian  efforts  to  appropriate  property  owned  by
others."m  Liberals  tend  to  support  such  redistributive  govern-
mental programs, so long as they provide the promise of progres-
siveness. In  certain  settings,  however, restrictions  on property
rights more  closely approximate  interests  in individual autono-
my and security than they do "mere" economic interests.  When
individual  autonomy  is implicated,  core  liberal  concerns  with
governmental overreaching may surface quickly.
One  can  speculate- also  about how  these  crosscutting  issues
have, in fact, prompted some of the vote swings discussed previ-
ously.  Justice  White  shifted  to  support  the  private  property
plaintiffs in both Lucas and Nollan, in each case supplying Jus-
tice Scalia with the crucial  fifth vote. One possible  explanation
for  Justice  White's shift is  that in each of these  cases,  unlike
those in which he had sided with the government, the plaintiff
sought to protect his right to build a home on residential proper-
ty.2  Notions  of personal  autonomy  and security  were  directly
implicated.  Concerns  about  governmental  overreaching  were,
accordingly,  more  acute than they  might have  been had mere
economic interests been at stake.
At least in Nollan, plaintiffs counsel seemed to anticipate this
advantage  in presenting  his  argument.  At  oral  argument,  he
stressed repeatedly the strong connection between the real prop-
erty rights being protected and noneconomic  concerns with indi-
vidual autonomy and security. Plaintiffs counsel referred repeat-
edly to the property's  use as a "family home" for parents  with
small  children.'27  He  emphasized  the  personally  intrusive  na-
124.  See  Pennsylvania  Coal  Co. v. Mahon,  260  U.S.  393,  415  (1922).
125.  See  EPSTEIN,  supra note  2,  at  344-46;  Thomas  W.  Merrill,  Rent Seeking  and
the  Compensation Principle, 80  NW.  U.  L.  REV.  1561,  1584-85  (1986)  (reviewing
Epstein's  Takings, supra note  2).
126.  See Lucas, 505  U.S.  at  1008; Nollan, 483  U.S.  at  827-28.
127.  See  Official  Transcript  Proceedings  Before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United
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ture of members  of the public walking just a few feet away from
a  private  residence.  He  described  for  the  Court how  plaintiffs
small  children  would  be  playing in plain  view just  a few  feet
from  where  strangers  would  lurk if the government's  position
were  upheld.'28 By the  time counsel  for the  government  rose to
defend  the  state law, the Justices'  questions  reflected  the  con-
cerns raised regarding individual security and privacy."
Chief Justice  Rehnquist's  votes likely reflect  a similar tug-of-
war. His vote and opinion for the  Court in favor  of the govern-
ment  in  PruneYard likely  reflected  the significant  federalism
concerns found in the case: the right of a state to decide the con-
tent  of its own  constitution  and its own  state property laws.3'
His tempered opinion for the Court in Dolan-tempered relative
to  what  Justice  Scalia  likely  would  have  written  for  the
Court-similarly  seemed  to  try  to  respond  to  the  legitimate
needs  of state  and  local  planners  to  engage  in urban  land-use
planning.'3' His recent dismissal  of the takings claim in Bennis
may  be  explained  by his  fairly traditional,  conservative  defer-
ence to government in the area of criminal law enforcement.'32
The advocacy in these cases reveals concerted efforts by coun-
sel to use these crosscutting issues to create the coalitions neces-
sary to yield a favorable judgment. In seeking to move  Justices
like Rehnquist to reject the takings claim, counsel for the appel-
States  at  3,  20,  Nollan (No. 86-133).
128.  See  id.  at  14  ("[Pleople  can  walk  along  just  a  few  feet  from  the  Nollans'
house.  They  can  see  over  the  seawall  directly  into  their  living  room....  Now,  as
any  parents  of  small  children,  that  concerns  them.");  id.  at  19  (stating  that  the
Nollans  "don't want the people  crossing  within  a  few  feet of their window,  to  go  out
and  ask them  to  cross  down  by the  waterway  and  stay away  from their private  resi-
dence,  for example,  if  their  small  children  are  playing  in  the  backyard");  id.  at  20
("As  parents  of  small  children,  you're  talking  about  the  backyard  of  their  home
....  [Pleople  could  wander  back and  forth right next  to  their  windows.");  id. at 28
("[W]e  are  dealing  with  a  program  that  takes  a  very  important  concern-this  is  a
private  residence,  a  family  with  small  children-away  from  this  family  to  serve  a
program,  a statewide  program.").
129.  See  id.  at  40-41  (questions  from  the  Court)  ("[Liet's  assume  there's  a  person
down the street that I think-I don't trust him. I mean, he just looks shifty  eyed. And
he takes  to  walking  back and forth  seven feet  away  from  my back  window, back and
forth; back and forth");  id.  at 42 ("Mr. Nollan  thought he  bought a privacy  buffer.").
130.  See supra note  57  and accompanying  text.
131.  See  supra note  56  and  accompanying  text.
132.  See supra note  64-67  and accompanying  text.
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lees in PruneYard, as well as the United States government in
its amicus brief, emphasized  federalism concerns,  including the
right of the states to define the scope of state property law and
the  right  to  petition  the  government.'33  In  Dolan, those  who
supported  the government's  defense  against  the  takings  claim
similarly underscored issues of federalism and complained about
the  tyranny  of  government  by  the  judiciary.'  The
government's brief in Bennis also was replete with reminders  of
the forfeiture's close nexus to a criminal prosecution, plainly de-
signed to appeal to conservatives  such as the Chief Justice.3 5
133.  The appellees'  brief focused  on  federalism  from  the start:
The  Federal  System  of our government  allows  and  encourages  the states
to  resolve their peculiar problems  under state  law. This court's  prior deci-
sions  concerning  expressive  activity  in  shopping centers  withheld  federal
protection  under  the  First  Amendment,  but  no  decision  has  undermined
the  states'  power  to  regulate  such  property  to  protect  fundamental  state
rights.
Brief of Appellees  at  14,  PruneYard  Shopping  Center  v. Robins,  447  U.S.  74  (1980)
(No. 79-289);  see also Brief for the United States As Amicus  Curiae  at 21, PruneYard
(No.  79-289)  ("State  law  conferring rights  in  property  and  defining the  limitations  of
those rights  is, accordingly,  ordinarily the source of those rights, rather than a taking
of them--especially  where,  as  here,  the pertinent  state  constitutional  provision  long
antedates  any claim  or investment  by the  [landowner].").  The  Chief Justice's  concern
with state  law  as  the  primary  source of  property  law  is  further reflected  in  an  ex-
change  with  government  counsel  at  oral  argument  in Ruckelshaus  v.  Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S.  986 (1984), in which he questioned counsel's  characterization  of the  definition
of "property" as  a question  of federal  law.  See  Official Transcript  Proceedings  Before
the  Supreme  Court of the  United  States  at  10,  Ruckelshaus (No.  83-196).  In Kaiser
Aetna  v.  United States, then-Justice  Rehnquist's  majority  opinion  similarly  stressed
that the marina  at issue  had  always  been  considered  private  property  under  appli-
cable Hawaii law. Kaiser Aetna v. United  States, 444  U.S.  164,  179 (1979).
134.  See  Brief for  Respondent  at 30,  Dolan v. City  of Tigard,  512  U.S.  374  (1994)
(No.  93-518)  ("Petitioner  apparently  wants the  Court  to return  to  those  Lochnerian
days  of heightened  judicial  review  of economic  regulation,  but now  under  the  guise
of takings  analysis  rather than through  that already-discredited  substantive  due pro-
cess  analysis.");  Brief of the  National  Association  of Counties,  Council  of State  Gov-
ernments, National League  of Cities,  International  City/County  Management Associa-
tion, National Institute of Municipal  Law  Officers,  and U.S.  Conference  of Mayors  As
Amici  Curiae  in Support of Respondent  at  12,  Dolan (No.  93-518)  (citing Lake  Coun-
try Estates,  Inc. v. Tahoe  Reg'l  Planning  Agency,  440  U.S.  391,  402  (1979))  ("Defer-
ence  to  the judgments  of local  governments  in  the area  of land-use  regulation  is  of
particular  importance  given  the  sensitive  and  complex  determinations  that such reg-
ulation  demands.").
135.  See  Brief for  the  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  Supporting  Respondent  at
25,  Bennis  v.  Michigan,  116  S.  Ct.  994  (1996)  (No.  94-8729)  ("Nothing  in  Lucas or
Dolan, neither  of which  involved  a forfeiture  of property  that had  been  used  illegal-1128 WILLIAM  AND MARY LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  38:1099
Understanding  Justice  Brennan's  motivation  for  siding with
the landowners seeking a constitutional damage remedy in First
English and  San Diego Gas requires  little  speculation. 3'  His
responsiveness  to  a  crosscutting  issue  was  fairly  explicit."7
Justice  Brennan  has  long  been  concerned  about  government
violations  of individual  constitutional  rights and has supported
constitutional  damage  remedies  to deter  and compensate  those
violations.'  It  is  not  surprising  therefore  that he  would  not
abandon his general support for constitutional damage remedies
in determining the  appropriate  remedy  for one  specific  kind of
constitutional  violation, namely regulatory  takings. Here again,
the briefs  in the  case reveal a concerted  effort by advocates  to
attract  traditional  liberal  support  for  constitutional  damage
remedies.'39  The  briefs  included  one  written  by  Pacific  Legal
Foundation lawyers  on  behalf of the  San Diego Urban  League,
arguing  that  curbing  governmental  overreaching  in  land-use
regulation  that  adversely  affected  racial  minorities  required  a
civil rights remedy.
ly, casts  doubt  on  th[e]  principle" that "if the  . . . government's  actions  comport, pro-
cedurally  and  substantively,  with  the  terms  of a  lawfully  enacted  forfeiture  statute,
it may  seize  private  property  without  compensating  the  owner.")  (citations  omitted);
id. ("Petitioner  did not  allege  or  prove  that she  took  all reasonable  steps  to  prevent
illegal  use  of the  car.").
136.  See supra notes  77-79  and  accompanying  text.
137.  See  San  Diego  Gas  & Elec.  Co.  v.  City  of San Diego,  450 U.S.  621,  661  n.26
(1981)  (Brennan, J.,  dissenting)  ("[I f a policeman  must  know  the  Constitution,  then
why  not a planner?").
138.  Justice  Brennan  has  authored  many  landmark  decisions  protecting  individual
rights  by  allowing  for  constitutional  damage  remedies.  See,  e.g.,  Carlson  v.  Green,
446  U.S.  14  (1980)  (supporting constitutional  damages  remedy);  Owen  v. City  of In-
dependence,  445  U.S.  622  (1980)  (supporting  constitutional  damages  remedy);  Davis
v.  Passman,  442  U.S.  228  (1979)  (supporting constitutional  damages  remedy);  Monell
v.  Department  of Soc.  Servs., 436  U.S. 658  (1978)  (supporting constitutional  damages
remedy);  Bivens  v.  Six  Unknown  Named  Agents  of  Fed.  Bureau  of Narcotics,  403
U.S.  388  (1971)  (supporting  constitutional  damages  remedy);  see  also  DeShaney  v.
Winnebago  County  Dep't.  of Soc.  Servs.,  489  U.S.  189,  203  (1989)  (Brennan, J.,  dis-
senting) (supporting constitutional  damages  remedy).
139.  See,  e.g.,  Brief of Appellant  at 37,  San Diego Gas  (No.  79-678)  (citing Owen,
445  U.S.  at  650-51)  ("[Tlhis  Court  . . . specifically  and  emphatically  held  that  dam-
age  compensation  is  available  and  is  to  be  awarded  when  constitutional  rights  are
violated  by  cities,  regardless  of the good  faith  of the  action  taken.").
140.  The Urban  League  contended  that:
Just as  this Court has forbidden  exclusion clearly based on race or nationalCOUNTING VOTES
Fewer judicial  tea leaves  evidence  why Justice  Stevens  dis-
sented with then-Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in
Penn Central, rather  than joining  Justice  Brennan's  majority
opinion.'  Justice  Stevens  does  not  appear  later  to  have  sec-
ond-guessed  that vote, as  he has since invoked that dissenting
opinion in other cases.'  A likely  distinction is that Penn Cen-
tral  is the only takings case that involved a regulation targeting
particular properties and landowners rather than applying to all
properties  equally.  The  general  applicability  of the regulation
was a factor  that Justice  Stevens  subsequently  emphasized  in
Lucas  while  defending  South  Carolina's  law. 4'  Counsel  for
Penn  Central  identified  that  particular  characteristic  as  "the
vice of this landmark law."'
Finally, Justice O'Connor's votes for the majority in First  Eng-
lish  (in  part)  and  Yolo  County45  likely  reflect  her  lingering
concerns about the federalism implications  of regulatory takings
claims.'46  Ironically,  both  she  and  Justice  Brennan  perceived
the same distinction between the merits of a takings  claim (i.e.,
whether  a taking has  occurred)  and the remedy  issue and,  in
addressing the latter, both willingly  allowed  other crosscutting
concerns  to  shift their votes." 47  In First  English, however,  each
origin,  so  should  this  Court disallow  and  deter  exclusion  which is  solely
motivated  by  a municipal  desire  to  further  purely  parochial  aims  to the
detriment of the  economically  disadvantaged.  A  wide range  of remedies is
necessary to ensure municipal responsibility  as well as accountability.
Brief of Amicus Curiae  San Diego  Urban League,  Inc.,  in Support of Appellant  at 19-
20, San Diego Gas (No.  79-678);  id. at  23-28  (relying extensively  on needs  of minori-
ties and on Justice Brennan's  opinion for the  Court in Owen, 445  U.S.  at 622).
141.  See  Penn  Cent.  Transp.  Co. v. New York  City, 438  U.S.  104,  138  (1978).
142.  See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 n.20 (1987).
143.  See  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1071-74  (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
144.  Official  Transcript  Proceedings  Before  the  Supreme  Court of the United  States
at  28,  Penn  Central (No.  77-444)  [hereinafter  Penn  Central Oral  Argument  Tran-
script]  (statement  of Mr. Gribbon);  see Penn Central, 438  U.S.  at  131  (noting Penn
Centrals  concession  that  no  taking  occurs  if a  development  restriction  is the  result
of a generally  applicable  law rather than  an individual landmark  designation).
145.  MacDonald,  Sommer  & Frates  v. County  of Yolo,  477  U.S.  340  (1986).
146.  See  supra notes  93-97  and  accompanying  text.
147.  In joining the majority opinion  in Yolo  County, Justices  O'Connor  and Brennan
agreed  that compensation  cannot  be deemed  "just" until "a court  knows  what use,  if
any,  may  be made  of the  affected  property."  Yolo  County, 477  U.S.  at  350.
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managed to offset the other as they moved in opposite directions.
Justice  O'Connor's  dissent  seems  motivated  by her  belief that
the ordinance challenged in that case prevented  a dangerous use
of a floodplain: the operation of a camp for disabled children.4'
Both the briefs  that were  filed in First English and the  oral
arguments  that  were  made  before  the  Court  demonstrate  the
advocates'  understanding that the most effective way to obtain a
Justice's vote is to use one of the crosscutting issues as leverage
to support his or her view of the merits of the regulatory takings
claim.  Those  supporting  a damages  remedy,  then,  stressed  to
Justice  O'Connor  the  abusive  and  unfair  tactics  employed  by
land-use  regulators.'  In  contrast,  those  resisting  a  damages
remedy  sought  to  persuade  conservative  Justices  like  Justice
O'Connor by repeatedly emphasizing the intrusiveness of damag-
es remedies on state and local governments  and the propriety of
judicial deference to legislative judgments.5 '
Accordingly,  the  Court's  regulatory  takings  precedent  is  not
simply the product of a debate on the meaning of private proper-
ty and its relationship to the police power. The votes of individu-
al Justices  are often as  much the result of their views on other
crosscutting jurisprudential concerns implicated by the regulato-
148.  See supra notes  96-98  and  accompanying  text.
149.  See First  English Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 97,  at 58 (statement  of
Michael  Berger, Counsel  for First English)  ("[Governmental  delays  and  lengthy litiga-
tion  in  regulatory  takings  cases]  is  the  kind  of horror  story,  Justice  O'Connor,  that
goes  on in California,  and it  goes  on all the time.").  The property  owner's  efforts  seem
to  have had  an impact  on Justice  O'Connor,  which,  despite  her  dissent  in First Eng-
lish,  may  explain  her  aggressive  stance  in  favor  of property  owners  in  subsequent
regulatory  takings  cases. See  id.  at  55  (statement of Justice  O'Connor)  ("IThere are
some  horror stories  out there  of local governments  intentionally running  these things
through  the  mill  indefinitely  ...  with  full  recognition  that  if  they lose  on  one  they
can  make  a  minor modification  of the  requirement  and  go  again and  effectively  de-
prive  people  forever of any use.");  supra note 91  and accompanying  text.
150.  Environmental  organizations  resisting  the  damages  remedy  sought  to  invoke
the  federalism  and judicial  activism  concerns  of conservative  Justices.  See,  e.g.,  Brief
of  the  National  Trust  for  Historic  Preservation,  National  Association  of  Counties,
National  Association  of  County  Planning  Directors,  National  Wildlife  Federation,
Preservation  Action,  and National  Parks  and  Conservation Association,  As  Amici  Cu-
riae  in Support  of Appellees  at  13,  San  Diego  Gas  & Elec.  Co. v. City  of San  Diego,
450  U.S.  621  (1981)  (No.  79-678)  ("Implying  a  [d]amage  [riemedy  [w]ould  [i]nterfere
with  the  [r]elationship  [bletween  [flederal  and  [sitate  [a]uthorities  and  [b]etween  the
[c]ourts  and  the  [liegislative  [biranch").
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ry takings debate. They may have inclinations regarding private
property and its relative importance, but for most Justices, those
inclinations are not the driving force behind their answers to the
legal  questions  presented. Each  Justice looks beyond that nar-
row debate and seeks to develop  a position that responds  to his
or her view on issues such as original intent, federalism, judicial
activism, the need for judicially manageable standards, and oth-
er similar  concerns,  in the ultimate  effort  to define  their  own
jurisprudential identity.  For that reason, scholars  and practitio-
ners seeking  to  proffer  a  workable  test for  regulatory takings
analysis are mistaken if they focus  on the property rights issue
in  isolation. In order to establish  a stable majority view  on the
Court, one must make a careful accounting of a variety of cross-
cutting issues  that underlie  the  shifting  coalitions  behind  the
Court's  discordant  rulings  to  date.  The  question  of how  some
Justices on the current Court might seek to accomplish that task
and  what  such  a  test  might  look  like  is  the  subject  of this
Essay's final lesson.
III.  LESSON NUMBER  THREE:  THE SIGNS OF A JUSTICE
KENNEDY-LED  MAJORITY  ON THE  COURT FOR A NEW
REGULATORY  TAKINGS  TEST
Piercing the Supreme.Court's  veil promotes understanding  of
the Court's regulatory takings precedent, including both the cur-
rent vulnerability of rulings like Lucas and the identity of those
factors that have produced the thin and shifting majorities sup-
porting the Court's  decisions.  Such  piercing  also provides  guid-
ance  regarding  what  a  new  majority  led  by  Justice  Kennedy
might decide in future regulatory takings  cases.  The seemingly
aberrant  votes  of individual  Justices  suggest  where  common
ground  is likely to be found between  otherwise  opposing views.
These votes are not necessarily the product of illogic or inconsis-
tency; they instead may reflect potential accommodation  and the
seeds  of future  compromise  between  what long have  remained
opposing, irreconcilable views.
Notwithstanding the inevitably speculative nature of the exer-
cise, predicting where that compromise might be struck is possi-
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ble.  This  is not  to  suggest  what the  Court  should  do. 5'  This
prediction, instead, involves  the far more problematic  undertak-
ing of gauging where the  Court's regulatory  takings analysis is
likely to go should Justice Kennedy attempt to forge a new ma-
jority  on the issue. Make  no mistake  about it-this is an exer-
cise in unabashed speculation.
Drawing on the analysis presented in the prior two sections  of
this  Essay, the general  ingredients  of a new,  centrist majority
led by Justice Kennedy would seem to be  (1)  Justice  Kennedy's
concurring  opinion  in Lucas,' 52  (2)  Justice  O'Connor's  concern
with state and local autonomy and the need to restrict activities
dangerous  to  human  life  and  health,'5'  (3)  Justice  Stevens's
concern with  singling out property  owners  for disproportionate
burdens  and  perhaps  with historic  preservation  laws  general-
ly," 5  (4)  Justice  Stevens's  further  concern  with  permanent
physical  occupation  of  private  property,'55  (5)  former-Justice
Brennan's concern (likely shared by the more liberal members  of
the current  Court) with government  abuse  of police  power  au-
thority  at the  expense  of individual  autonomy  and  security,5'
(6)  former-Justice  White's related  concern  with the sanctity  of
the home,'57  (7)  Justice  Souter's  concern with the limits of tak-
ings analysis and the propriety of the judicial role in overseeing
state  and  local  land-use  planning,' s  and  (8)  Justice  Breyer's
views on the impropriety of presuming constitutional codification
of a particular economic theory and the necessity  of allowing for
police  power  restrictions  protective  of  human  health  and
151.  For  criticism  of  the  "fundamental  rights"  framework  emerging  in  the  Court's
regulatory takings  cases,  see Rubenfeld,  supra note  6,  at  1097-11.
152.  505  U.S.  1003,  1032  (1992)  (Kennedy,  J., concurring  in the judgment).
153.  See  supra notes  94-97  and accompanying  text.
154.  See  supra notes  142-44  and  accompanying  text.
155.  See  supra notes  86-89  and  accompanying  text.
156.  See  supra notes  81,  138 and  accompanying  text.
157.  See  supra note  126  and  accompanying  text.
158.  See  Dolan v.  City  of Tigard,  512  U.S.  374,  411-14  (1994)  (Souter, J.,  dissent-
ing) (arguing  that the  Court  is  improperly  addressing  issues  not raised  by  the  facts
before  the  Court);  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1076-78
(1992)  (statement of Souter,  J.)  (voting to  dismiss  the writ  of certiorari);  cf  United
States v.  Lopez,  115  S.  Ct.  1624,  1651-52  (1995)  (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing  for
deference  to  the  legislature).
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safety.159
Because Justice Kennedy is the most likely instigator of a new
majority,  his  concurring  opinion  in Lucas provides  the  logical
starting  point  for  developing  a  new  framework.  That  opinion
certainly presents the possibility of a middle-ground  position. In
his Lucas opinion, Justice Kennedy challenged both sides of the
regulatory takings debate and took a few tentative steps toward
bridging their differences.
First, Justice Kennedy challenged the two mainstay positions
of the Lucas majority. He contended that total economic depriva-
tion was  not enough  to justify  a per se approach. 60  He  further
argued that, in any event, the common law of nuisance and oth-
er background principles  of the common law do not provide the
exclusive justification for denying just compensation  for  such a
complete deprivation of property rights.16'
Justice Kennedy  offered in place of the Lucas majority's  ana-
lytic framework one requiring an independent  assessment of the
loss  of value  in  light  of  the  landowner's  reasonable  expecta-
tions." ' 62  This  inquiry  would  include  consideration  of the prop-
erty owner's  actual intent as well as  his capacity  to undertake
the use, the prevention of which now forms the basis of his tak-
ings  claim."  Justice  Kennedy  also  argued  that  mere  back-
ground principles of the common law were insufficient to define
a property  owner's  reasonable  expectations.  He  argued instead
that  such  interests  could  find  a basis  in  "objective  rules  and
customs  that can be understood  as reasonable by all parties in-
159.  See  supra notes  30-33  and  accompanying  text.
160.  See  Lucas,  505  U.S.  at  1034  (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring  in  the  judgment)
("Where a  taking is  alleged  from regulations  which  deprive  the  property  of all value,
the  test  must  be  whether  the  deprivation  is  contrary  to  reasonable,  investment-
backed  expectations.").
161.  See  id.  at  1035  (Kennedy,  J., concurring  in  the judgment)  (citing  Goldblatt  v.
Town  of Hempstead,  369 U.S.  590,  593  (1962))  ("In  my view, reasonable  expectations
must  be understood  in light of the  whole  of our legal  tradition.  The  common  law  of
nuisance  is  too  narrow  a  confine  for  the  exercise  of regulatory  power  in  a  complex
and  interdependent  society.").
162.  See  id. at  1034  (Kennedy, J., concurring  in the judgment).
163.  See id. at  1033  (Kennedy,  J., concurring  in the judgment) ("Among  the matters
to  be considered  on  remand must  be whether  petitioner  had  the  intent  and  capacity
to  develop  the  property  and  failed  to  do  so  in the  interim  period  because  the State
prevented him.").
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volved.""'
According  to Justice  Kennedy, these  objective  rules  and cus-
toms extend to the government's "enacting new regulatory initia-
tives  in  response  to  changing  conditions ....  ."'  In justifying
restrictions  beyond  the  common law, he  offered  as an  example
the government's  need to restrict private uses on a "fragile land
system"  like  coastal  property,  even  if such  restrictions  might
result  in  the  complete  destruction  of  economic  value.'  Such
restrictions, in Justice Kennedy's  view, would not interfere with
the reasonable  expectations  of an  owner  of ecologically  fragile
property.
Justice Kennedy's  concurrence in Lucas also challenged those
who favor  governmental  regulation.  He  suggested  that not all
governmental  ends would be sufficiently weighty to warrant de-
nying  compensation.  He  identified  promotion  of tourism  as  a
governmental goal that would not justify the absence  of compen-
sation.'67  Additionally,  Justice  Kennedy  introduced  a  new  di-
mension  to  takings  analysis  by  asserting  that the  regulatory
means as well as the ends must be reasonable in order  to pass
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause muster.'
A  possible  analytical  framework  that  emerges  from  Justice
Kennedy's  views is  not unlike that which  the Court utilizes  in
other areas  of constitutional law. Takings  scrutiny would essen-
tially have two different levels, in much the same way that the
Court applies  different levels of scrutiny to decide equal protec-
tion," ' 69  First  Amendment,7 '  and  dormant  Commerce  Clause
challenges."'
164.  Id.  at  1035  (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring in the judgment).
165.  Id.  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring in the judgment).
166.  Id.  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring in the judgment).
167.  See  id.  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring  in the judgment).
168.  See  id.  (Kennedy, J.,  concurring  in the judgment).
169.  See  Bush v. Vera,  116  S.  Ct.  1941  (1996)  (applying  strict scrutiny  review to  a
state's  redistricting  plan);  Shaw  v.  Hunt,  116  S.  Ct.  1894  (1996)  (applying  strict
scrutiny  review  to  a  state's  redistricting  plan);  Romer  v.  Evans,  116  S.  Ct.  1620
(1996)  (applying rational  basis review  to  Colorado's  "Amendment  2").
170.  See  McIntyre  v.  Ohio  Elections  Comm'n,  115  S.  Ct.  1511,  1519  (1995)  (apply-
ing  strict  scrutiny  to  political speech);  City  of Cincinnati v. Discovery  Network,  Inc.,
507  U.S.  410,  417  n.13  (1993)  (applying intermediate  scrutiny to  commercial  speech);
Larsen  v. Valente,  456  U.S.  228,  246  (1982)  (applying  strict scrutiny  to  cases  involv-
ing  religious  freedom).
171.  See  Oregon  Waste  Sys.,  Inc. v.  Department  of Envtl. Quality,  511  U.S.  93,  98-
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There would, in the first instance, be an inquiry into the  al-
leged deprivation in  order to gauge its relative severity based on
its  character  and  degree.  This  first-level  inquiry  would  deter-
mine whether the takings  issue at hand implicated  a "core" or
"fundamental" concern of the Just Compensation Clause. Wheth-
er  the  landowner's  deprivation  warranted  just  compensation
would turn on that inquiry in  combination with an inquiry into
the substantiality of the government's justification for the chal-
lenged restriction, based similarly on the character of the justifi-
cation and the degree to which the restriction is reasonably nec-
essary to serve that justification. The injection of the "necessary"
qualifier reflects Justice Kennedy's  stated concern with the rea-
sonableness  of the "means" as  well  as  the  "ends" of the  chal-
lenged restriction.
Core  concerns  would  trigger,  in  effect,  heightened  takings
scrutiny. Just compensation  would  not be  required  per se,  but
the government  would have  to  survive heightened  scrutiny  to
avoid  the compensation  requirement. The test would  make dif-
ferences  in  kind  dispositive  and would  turn  on  differences  in
degree  only  when  they  reached  the  level  of  gross
disproportionality.  The  inquiries  would  remain  fairly  binary:
akin to heightened  takings  scrutiny for some kinds  of interfer-
ences  and  diminished scrutiny  for  lesser interests.  The  courts
have utilized such approaches more or less successfully in  a host
of other constitutional  contexts, albeit with a tendency to create
compromising  categories  of mid-level  scrutiny.172  Such  blunt-
edged  approaches  cause  difficulties  at  the  borders73  but  are
worthwhile  so long as the categories  provide for easy disposition
of the vast majority of cases.
The  challenge,  of course,  would be to  identify the categories:
99  (1994)  (explaining which  level of scrutiny to  apply in  negative  Commerce  Clause
cases);  Wyoming  v.  Oklahoma,  502  U.S.  437,  454  (1992)  (finding  protectionist  state
statutes  per  se  invalid  under the  Commerce  Clause).
172.  See, e.g.,  Florida Bar v.  Went For  It,  Inc.,  115  S.  Ct. 2371,  2375-76  (1995)  (de-
scribing  "intermediate" level  scrutiny for restrictions  on  commercial  speech);  J.E.B.  v.
Alabama ex  rel. T.B.,  511  U.S.  127,  135  (1994)  (describing "heightened  equal  protec-
tion scrutiny"  review of gender-based  classifications).
173.  See,  e.g.,  Discovery Network,  507  U.S.  at  419  ("This  very  case  illustrates  the
difficulty  of drawing  bright lines that  will  clearly  cabin  commercial  speech  in  a dis-
tinct category.').
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(1)  the kinds of interferences  with private  property that would
warrant  the  greatest  degree  of protection  and  (2)  the kinds  of
governmental  interests,  if  any,  capable  of justifying  the  most
intrusive  restrictions  without  compensation.  At  one  end of the
spectrum would  be  total  destruction  of economic  value, which
generally would warrant  heightened judicial  scrutiny. Defining
the center  of the  spectrum  is more  difficult, however,  and Jus-
tice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence  suggests where  to draw some
of the finer distinctions. Any economic  deprivation  under a tak-
ings claim must be based on actual rather than theoretical con-
templated use, and the actual use must be clearly lawful at the
time  that  the  property  owner's  expectations  came  into  fru-
ition.'74  Otherwise, the  expectations  are not sufficiently reason-
able  to warrant  heightened  constitutional  protection.  In  addi-
tion, owners of fragile land systems would generally be on notice
that the government might need to enact substantial restrictions
on the use of the property  to guard against the possible adverse
consequences  of developing such land.'7'
Justice Kennedy's  concurrence also suggests that promotion  of
tourism, business, and other economic redistributive goals would
not be legislative  ends capable  of satisfying heightened  takings
scrutiny. Hence, just compensation would be required in instanc-
es  of total  destruction  of economic value.'7'  Although such  con-
cerns are entirely legitimate and important bases for police pow-
er restrictions on the use of land, the Court's new majority likely
would  conclude  that it  is  proper  to  assign  them less weight  in
the takings  equation  than  they would  a  police  power measure
intended to prevent serious public health and safety risks. In the
former  circumstances,  the  police  power  measure  is  exclusively
distributional in character.  Depriving one property owner  of all
economic  value  for  the  benefit  of another  competing  economic
value normally would require just compensation.'77
174.  See  Lucas  v.  South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1033  (1992)
(Kennedy,  J., concurring  in the judgment).
175.  See  id.  at  1035  (Kennedy, J., concurring  in the judgment).
176.  See  id.  (Kennedy, J., concurring  in the judgment).
177.  Somewhat  analogous  concerns  have  been  expressed  in  the  Court's  dormant
Commerce  Clause  cases.  See  Sporhase  v.  Nebraska  ex  rel.  Douglas,  458  U.S.  941,
956  (1982)  (recognizing  the  difference  between  economic  protectionism  and  health
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On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy maintained in Lucas,
government  regulations  aimed  at  stabilizing  especially  fragile
land  systems  could  satisfy  the  heightened  takings  review.178
The  reasons  for  the  governmental  restriction  may  have
distributional or aesthetic dimensions, but they are not exclusive-
ly so. The basic maintenance of those land systems typically can
serve  even weightier and more substantial  ends because  of the
degree and kind of harms that result from their disruption.'79
The prior votes and opinions of other likely members of a Jus-
tice  Kennedy  majority  further  fill  out  this  new  takings
framework."  Permanent  physical  invasions  or  occupations
would  plainly  trigger  heightened  takings  scrutiny. 8'  So  too
would interferences  with property rights that implicate core pri-
vate property concerns  with personal  autonomy and security.'82
One  example  would  be  governmental  prohibition  of  a
landowner's construction  of a single-family home for her person-
al use. Another might be governmental  engagement in continu-
ous,  proximate  overflight  of  private  residential  property."
Governmental  prohibitions  on  traditional  rights  and  uses  of
property,  such  as  basic  subsistence  activity or the right  to de-
vise, also would likely merit heightened takings scrutiny.'
Restrictions on the use of property in order to promote historic
preservation  would satisfy normal  takings review but would be
less likely to survive heightened takings scrutiny as applied by a
Justice  Kennedy-led  majority."  Restrictions  that  would  pass
and  safety regulations).
178.  See Lucas, 505  U.S.  at  1035  (Kennedy, J., concurring  in the judgment).
179.  See id.  (Kennedy,  J., concurring in the.judgment).
180.  See  Laura  S.  Underkufller-Freund,  Takings and the Nature of Property, 9  CA-
NADIAN  J.L.  & JURISPRUDENCE  161,  185  (1996)  (describing  how  under emerging  Su-
preme  Court precedent  "all  property  interests  are  not  held  with  the  same intensity
and  are  not protected  equally" and how  there is a  "hierarchical  ordering  of stringen-
cy  of protection").
181.  See  Lucas, 505  U.S.  at  1015.
182.  See  supra notes  81,  136 and  accompanying  text.
183.  See Brown v. United  States, 73  F.3d  1100  (Fed.  Cir.  1996).
184.  See  Hodel  v. Irving, 481  U.S.  704,  716  (1987).
185.  Even  the  United  States  as  amicus  curiae  in  support  of the  City  of New  York
in Penn Central agreed  that  the  historic  landmark  designation  would  amount  to  a
taking if  the  property  owner  was  not provided  a  "reasonable  return."  Penn Central
Oral  Argument  Transcript,  supra note  144,  at  59.  The  federal  government's  argu-
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muster under heightened  analysis, on the other hand, would in-
clude  those that safeguard human health  and safety,'  as long
as they are reasonably necessary. As proposed by Justice Kenne-
dy in Lucas, this inquiry would  focus on the reasonableness  of
the  means.87  A court  would  consider  whether  the  restrictions
were reasonably or narrowly tailored, including the reasonable-
ness of the fit between the government's purposes and the object
of the restriction. The government would need to demonstrate a
cause-and-effect  relationship  between  the  property  use  re-
stricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regula-
tion seeks to remedy. [So long as] the owner's use of the prop-
erty is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source  of the
social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out
unfairly.188
An inquiry into the reasonableness  of the means likely would
not require  a  distinct  less restrictive  alternative  analysis,  but
that issue will probably be a matter of considerable discussion in
the fashioning of this new approach.  In other  areas of constitu-
tional law,  the Court has embraced  such  a heightened  inquiry
into means without  subjecting the restriction to less restrictive
alternative  scrutiny.'89  To  satisfy  this  standard,  a  restriction
ment  in that  case  was  presented  by  then-Assistant  Attorney  General  Patricia  Wald,
now  a  federal  appellate judge.
186.  Like  Justice  O'Connor  in First English, see  supra note  97,  Justice  Kennedy  in
Lucas  repeatedly  posed  questions  at  oral  argument  suggesting  that  there  are  in-
stances when  all economic  uses  can  be taken  for urgent  safety  reasons  and  not  com-
pensated,  citing  earthquake  faults  and  coastal property  as  two  examples.  See  Official
Transcript  Proceedings  Before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  at  15-16,
Lucas  (No.  91-453).  The  identity  of Justice  Kennedy is not  evident  on  the face  of the
transcript;  his identity  is  derived  from  the  author's notes  taken  at the  oral argument
itself (notes  on  file  with  the  author).
187.  See  supra note  168  and  accompanying  text.
188.  Pennell  v.  City  of San  Jose,  485  U.S.  1,  20  (1988)  (Scalia,  J., concurring  in
part  and dissenting  in part).  The  Court's  ruling in Pennell is especially  significant  in
discerning  possible  compromise  because  Justices  Brennan,  White,  Marshall,
Blackmun,  and  Stevens  all joined  the  Chief Justice's  majority  opinion.  See  id. at  3.
Justices  Scalia  and  O'Connor joined  only  in part,  and Justice  Kennedy  did  not  par-
ticipate  in the  case.  See  id. at  20.
189.  The Court  currently  uses this  approach  in the First  Amendment area to  deter-
mine  the validity  of government  regulation  of commercial  speech.  See Florida  Bar v.
Went  For It,  Inc.,  115  S.  Ct.  2371,  2380  (1995)  (quoting  Board  of Trustees  v. Fox,
492  U.S.  469,  480  (1989))  ("IT]he  least  restrictive  means'  test has  no  role  in  theCOUNTING VOTES
must not be unduly over- or underinclusive. An example  of im-
permissible  underinclusiveness  could  be a restriction  that sin-
gles  out  one  property  owner  for  severe  use  restrictions  but
leaves other, similarly situated properties unrestricted. "A regu-
lation  need not be 'absolutely the least severe that will achieve
the desired end,' but if there are numerous  and obvious less-bur-
densome  alternatives  to  the restriction...  that is  certainly  a
relevant  consideration  in determining whether the 'fit' between
ends and means  is reasonable."9° Where  the fit is deemed  un-
reasonable, compensation would be required.
In many respects,  of course, Justice Scalia already is trying to
lead the Court to a takings analysis with his own binary frame-
work.  The  substance  of that analysis,  however, would  be very
different.  Under  his  view,  the  per  se  takings  catego-
ries-physical  occupation  and  total  economic  depriva-
tion'9 -- undoubtedly  would  be  much  larger,  and  the  takings
test  for  those  intrusions  falling  outside  the per  se  categories
would be significantly more demanding.
Justice  Brennan's  "rule of  five,"  however,  likely  prevented
Justice Scalia from going as far as he would have preferred to go
in Lucas. He  was  unable  to  answer  the  crucial  denominator
question raised by the Lucas framework:  "[How  to]  make clear
the  'property interest'  against which the  loss of value is  to be
measured."'92  If the  economic  impact inquiry  is  based on  "par-
cel  as  a  whole"  analysis, 93  compensation  will  rarely be justi-
commercial  speech  context.  'What  our  decisions  require,'  instead,  'is a  "fit"  between
the  legislature's  ends  and the  means  chosen  to  accomplish  those  ends,'  a fit  that is
not necessarily  perfect,  but  reasonable  . . . .");  City  of Cincinnati  v.  Discovery  Net-
work,  Inc.,  507  U.S.  410,  416  (1993)  (quoting Fox, 492  U.S.  at 480) ("It [is]  the  city's
burden  to  establish  a  'reasonable  fit'  between  its  legitimate  interests  in  safety  and
esthetics  and  its  choice  of a  limited  and  selective  prohibition  of  newsracks  as  the
means  chosen  to  serve those  interests.").
190.  Discovery Network,  507  U.S.  at 417  n.13 (quoting Fox, 492  U.S.  at 480).
191.  See  Lucas  v. South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  505  U.S.  1003,  1015-16  (1992).
192.  Id. at  1016  n.7. Justice  Scalia, writing  for the  Court in Lucas, explicitly  recog-
nized  the  significance  of the  denominator  issue.  See id. ("Regrettably, the  rhetorical
force  of our 'deprivation  of all economically  feasible  use' rule  is greater than  its pre-
cision,  since  the rule  does  not  make  clear  the  'property interest'  against which  the
loss  of value is  to be  measured.").
193.  See id. at  1016-17  n.7;  Keystone  Bituminous  Coal  Ass'n v.  DeBenedictis,  480
U.S.  470,  496-99  (1987)  (applying  "parcel  as  a whole"  analysis);  Penn  Cent.  Transp.
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fied-invariably  some part of the property will possess residual
economic  value.  If  the inquiry is  based on  a  denominator  that
considers just the most restricted part of the property, however,
compensation will be  ordered far more routinely. Justice  Scalia
no  doubt would have  liked to  address that issue, but, in  doing
so, he probably would have lost Justice White's vote and perhaps
Justice O'Connor's vote as well.
Justice  Kennedy, however,  appears interested in leading the
Court down  a quite  different path.  His willingness  to  do  so in
future cases will turn on the strength of his conviction that Jus-
tice Scalia's  position  is  ill-advised  and not  susceptible  to mere
fine-tuning. Even if  willing, Justice  Kennedy's  ability to  create
the new majority will also turn on the willingness of some of the
more  liberal  Justices  to  temper  their  own views  to  achieve  a
more centrist position.
CONCLUSION
Wishful thinking of others notwithstanding, the "takings puz-
zle"  has  not  been  solved.'94  In  certain  respects,  the  pieces  of
that puzzle are in as much disarray as ever. The Lucas majority
view  does not solve the puzzle;95  that decision is not even like-
ly to be weighty precedent before the current Court.
The most likely solution to the puzzle will not come from Jus-
tice Scalia, even though he has written many of the Court's most
recent significant regulatory takings opinions. It  will more likely
come from Justice Kennedy, who has written no opinions for the
Court on the issue. The signs of a Justice Kennedy-inspired new
majority  are already  evident. They present themselves  both in
his surprising concurring opinion in Lucas as well as in a careful
parsing of those various votes of the other Justices that likewise
seemed  initially  surprising  or even  anomalous.  Together,  they
Co.  v.  New  York  City,  438  U.S.  104,  130-31  (1978)  ("raking[sl' jurisprudence  does
not divide  a  single  parcel  into  discrete  segments  and  attempt  to  determine  whether
rights  in  a particular  segment  have been  entirely  abrogated....  [Tihis  Court  focus-
es  rather  both  on  the  character  of the  action  and  on  the nature  and  extent  of the
interference  with  rights  in the  parcel  as  a whole  .... ").
194.  But  see  Douglas  W.  Kmiec,  At  Last, the  Supreme  Court Solves  the  Takings
Puzzle,  19  HARV.  J.L. &  PUB.  POLY  147  (1995).
195.  But  see id.  at 148,  151-52.
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present  the  possibility  a  of new  compromise.  The  willingness
and  ability of those Justices  to forge  that compromise  remains
an open question.  So, too,  does the impact of Justice Brennan's
unrelenting "rule of five" when change  in  the Court's  member-
ship next occurs.'96
196.  The  two most  likely  Justices  to  retire  next-Chief Justice  Rehnquist  and  Jus-
tice  Stevens  (with  Justice  O'Connor  as  an  outside  possibility)-would  shift  the
Court's voting  in very different  directions.
1997] 1141